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Abstract
We contribute to the growing empirical literature on monetary and fiscal in-
teractions by applying a sign restriction identification scheme to a structural
TVP-VAR in order to disentangle and evaluate the policy shocks and policy
transmissions. This in turn allows us to study the Great Recession in a con-
sistent fashion. Four facts stand out from our findings. We observe significant
differences in the endogenous responses to shocks in particular between the
Volcker period and the Great Recession, and find that monetary policy reacts
more aggressively during Volcker chairmanship and fiscal policy during the
Great Recession to stabilize the economy. Second, impulse responses confirm
that there is a high degree of interactions between monetary and fiscal policies
over time. Third, in the forecast error variance decomposition we find that
while government revenues largely influence decisions on government spend-
ing, government spending does not influence tax decisions. Fourth and final,
our analysis of the fiscal transmission channel reveals that tax cuts, because of
their crowding-in effects, are more effective in expanding output than govern-
ment spending rises, since the tax multiplier is higher and more persistent. In
light of the current recession and the zero lower bound of the interest rate, tax
cuts can, by providing the right incentives to the private sector, result in high
and very persistent growth in output if private agent expectations regarding
the length and the financing structure of the fiscal expansion are delicately
managed jointly by the two authorities.
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1 Introduction
Locating the appropriate degree of interaction between fiscal and monetary policy
plays an important role in ensuring economic stability. This has been most evident
during the Great Recession in the US, when on one hand, the Fed reduced the Federal
Funds rate by more than 500 basis points from August 2007 and injected a vast
amount of liquidity into the financial system through the three quantitative easings
(the first announced in November 2008, the second in November 2010, and the third
in September 2012). Worried additionally by the persistently high long-term yields,
the Fed launched moreover two ‘Operation twists’ (first running between September
2011 and June 2012, and the second from July to December 2012) whereby the
Fed exchange their shorter-dated liabilities for longer-term Treasuries in order to
bring the prices of longer-term bonds up, and the yields down, while generating the
opposite effect on the short-term bonds. In parallel, the US Congress passed two
fiscal packages, the Economics Stimulus Act of 125 billion dollar in 2008, and the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 787 billion dollar in early 2009, and
one fiscal reform, the Jump-Start Our Business Start-Ups Act in March 2012, a law
intended to encourage funding of small businesses by easing a number of securities
regulations. Their joint economic impact is, however, still unclear. The theoretical
and empirical literature on fiscal-monetary interactions is equally inconclusive and
points in multiple directions. It goes so far that there is no consensus to whether a
(systematic or regular) coordination between fiscal and monetary policy ever existed
in the US.
Against this background, our interest lies in examining in-depth the actual policy
interactions over the past three decades (1979-2012). We allow for changes in the
US economic structure, and jointly study the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal
policy in stabilizing the economy. Further, we will examine the fiscal transmission
mechanism and monetary pass-through over time and provide empirical evidence on
the structural shocks that have been most important in explaining the fluctuations
of the US economy over this period.
There is a richer theoretical literature on fiscal-monetary interactions compared
to the empirical.1That is an outcome that has evolved from the difficulty of com-
1They find that it is very important to jointly study the fiscal and monetary policy in order to
determine the equilibrium. Chadha and Nolan (2007) find that Taylor-like monetary and fiscal rules
are a good representation of US and UK stabilization policies. Neglecting the role of automatic
stabilizers in designing the optimal policies has immediate effects for the optimal monetary policy.
So, for instance, a passive fiscal policy requires a large long-run response of the policy rate to
2
paring theoretical and empirical results. When appropriate care is taken for the
diverse complications inherent in macroeconomic time series, such as unit roots,
and in the case of policy decisions, real time versus revised data, then results from
standard theoretical and empirical models strongly diverge (Reade and Stehn, 2008,
and Juselius, 2007). As a consequence, the empirical models have departed from
their theoretical counterparts.
Several interesting insights have emerged from the empirical fiscal-monetary
models. Fragetta and Kirsanova (2007) model policy interactions in the UK, Sweden
and the US. Using Leeper’s (1991) definition of leader and follower they investigate
whether one or the other authority has acted as a leader. They find no evidence for
dominance in the US, and suggest that the two authorities ignore each other. On the
other end, Muscatelli et al. (2004), using generalized methods of moments, estimate
a forward-looking new-Keynesian model for the US. They find that depending on
the shocks considered, the nature of fiscal-monetary interactions has been different.
For business cycle shocks, monetary and fiscal policies act as compliments, meaning
that when monetary policy is tightened, so is fiscal policy. However, for a monetary
shock, a tighter monetary policy results in a relaxed fiscal policy, hence acting as
substitutes. Reade and Stehn (2008) also find evidence for policy interactions in
the US, since both policies are countercyclical, and each of them takes into account
the actions of the other. Conversely, Melitz (2002) finds that monetary and fiscal
policies move in opposite directions, thus behave as substitutes. On the economic
effects of the two policies, Melitz (2002) and Muscatelli et al. (2004) find that spend-
ing responds in a destabilizing manner to current output, while taxes behave in a
stabilizing fashion.2For monetary policy, Muscatelli et al. (2004) detect a stabiliz-
inflation for the previous optimum to be reached (Chadha and Nolan (2007), Annicchiarico et al
(2012)). Davig and Leeper (2010) estimate Markov-switching policy rules for the US and find that
the monetary and fiscal policy fluctuate between active and passive behavior. In a New-Keynesian
model, this results in positive spending multipliers, but the intensity of the multiplier depends on
the degree of crowding out in private consumption and investment that the policy causes. Moreover,
Annicchiarico et al (2012) argue that the fiscal expansions tend to generate an intertemporal trade-
off. The positive fiscal shocks are expansionary in the short-run, but depending on the monetary
policy rule pursued, are likely to generate persistent adverse effects in the medium-run. Baxter and
King (1993), and Davig and Leeper (2010) find that the negative effects of fiscal policy result from
the higher tax burden in the future. Finally, Gali and Monacelli (2008) show that in a currency
union with country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities, inflation should be stabilized at the
union level, while the countercyclical fiscal policy should be country-specific when the latter seek
to limit the size of the domestic output gap and inflation differentials resulting from idiosyncratic
shocks.
2Muscatelli et al. (2004) find, however, that spending responds in a stabilizing manner to
lagged output.
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ing role of the interest rate relative to output, and Reade and Stehn (2008) show
that monetary policy has a stronger impact on economic activity compared to fiscal
policy.
In short, the empirical results are inconclusive, and depend strongly on the
methodology used. Nevertheless, the majority of them point at least toward an im-
plicit coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities, and indicate a greater
effectiveness of monetary policy in dampening output volatility.
We use the recently established structural time varying parameter VAR (hence-
forth TVP-VAR) to examine US policies between 1979:I-2012:II. The structural
TVP-VAR was put forward by Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005) to
establish and examine the different monetary policy regimes that the US has under-
gone since the post-war period. While they observe some deviation in the impulse
responses during the oil-shocks and early Volcker period, for the remaining sample,
they find insignificant time-variation. Moreover, they note that most of the variation
is attributed to the variance of the residuals, and not to the coefficients. Separately,
Kirchner et al. (2010) and Pereira and Lopes (2010) have used a TVP-VAR to ex-
amine the effect of fiscal policy shocks. While the former has employed a recursive
assumption to identify spending shocks, the latter use the method of Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) to identify tax and spending shocks.3More recently, Hauzenberger
(2012) has performed a similar analysis for a fiscal TVP-VAR with a special focus
on debt dynamics but which does not include the monetary side.
The study closest to ours is Rossi and Zubairy (2011).4They jointly consider mon-
etary and fiscal shocks in their analysis of the US economy, and find that conditioning
monetary policy and fiscal policy on each other is crucial for producing unbiased
estimates of the business cycle drivers. Additionally, by means of variance decom-
positions, they find that monetary policy shocks are most important for explaining
business cycle fluctuations in output, consumption and hours, while fiscal policy
shocks are most important for explaining cyclical volatilities over the medium-term.
Nevertheless their study was performed using a fixed-coefficient structural VAR and
so the contribution of each shock is invariant during that sample period. In the
same manner, the fiscal transmission channel is not allowed to alter with changing
3See also Fatas and Mihov (2001) for recursive assumptions.
4Mountford and Uhlig (2009) falls to a certain extent into this category. They identify both
monetary and fiscal shocks, but concentrate their analysis on the effects of fiscal policy and not
the interaction between the two policies. Monetary policy is identified in order to isolate its effects
from fiscal policy.
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economic conditions. Our TVP-VAR will correct for this omission by allowing the
shocks and the fiscal transmission to vary over time.
Our empirical approach is based on a five variable version of the Bayesian TVP-
VAR technique with stochastic volatility. The variables we include are output, gov-
ernment spending, net taxes, a short-term interest rate and inflation. We identify
four shocks—business cycle, monetary policy, spending, and taxes—through theo-
retically robust sign restrictions. There is a fifth shock in this model (a residual
shock), but because the shock is activated by innovations in one of the other model
variables, it is not identified and therefore does not have a structural interpretation.
Moreover, the sign restrictions are a partial identification method and there is there-
fore no necessity to identify as many fundamental shocks as variables in our model
(see, e.g., Uhlig, 2005). Further, identifying a business cycle shock jointly with the
other shocks is crucial to separate automatic effects of output fluctuations from dis-
cretionary policy measures (Mountford and Uhlig, 2009). In the context of policy
interactions, the sign restrictions framework does not oblige us to impose timing
assumptions regarding the fiscal-monetary interaction, since the interactions can be
contemporaneous or lagged, thus implying more adequate empirical results. Lastly,
allowing the volatility of errors to vary over time is becoming increasingly impor-
tant in macroeconomics, not only because the volatilities of many macroeconomic
variables have changed over time (e.g. going from the 1970’s to the Great Modera-
tion in mid-80’s.), but also because many issues of macroeconomic policy hinge on
error variances of, amongst other, price and output levels. For these reasons, we
wish to capture these volatility variations in our model, and study the responses of
monetary and fiscal policies to these shifts in the economy.
The paper makes four principal contributions. First, we observe significant time
variation in the model parameters (and volatilities of residuals) between 1979 and
2012. All our results confirm that there are three regimes in the US economy: the
Volcker chairmanship (1979-84), the Great Moderation (1985-2007), and the Great
Recession (2008-12). More specifically, we observe significant differences in the en-
dogenous responses to shocks in particular between the Volcker period and the Great
Recession, and find that monetary policy reacts more aggressively during Volcker
chairmanship and fiscal policy during the Great Recession to stabilize the economy.
Second, impulse responses show that there is a high degree of interactions between
monetary and fiscal policies over time. Whereas for a tax shock, the policies act as
substitutes, we note significant time variation for the other shocks. On one hand,
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the two policies behave as substitutes for both the monetary policy and govern-
ment spending shocks during the Volcker era, while on the other, they behave as
compliments during the Great Recession. Moreover, both the monetary and (net)
fiscal policy has a stabilizing effect on output, albeit government spending behaves
in a destabilizing fashion. Third, decomposition of forecast error variance of gov-
ernment spending shows that spending itself is largely acyclical, indicating strong
inertias and path-dependencies in spending decisions. In addition, we find that
while government revenues largely influence decisions on spending, spending does
not influence tax decisions. Along the same lines, we observe a significant degree of
coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities in the decomposition exercise
where both authorities take into account the decisions of the other. Fourth and
final, our analysis of the fiscal transmission channel reveals two things. Tax cuts,
because of their crowding-in effects, are more efficient in expanding the economy
than government spending rises, since the tax multiplier is higher and more persis-
tent, in particular during the Volcker regime. The second thing we note is that fiscal
shocks are more quickly transmitted onto prices than the monetary policy shock.
This suggests there might be frictions in the US monetary transmission channel,
such as financial market frictions (banking, credit, leverage) that cause a delayed
response of prices to monetary policy shocks.
The remainder of the paper is outlined in the following way. Section 3.2 de-
scribes the econometric framework, including data, the identification scheme, the
model specification, and the Bayesian technique used (further details on Bayesian
inference including the sampling algorithm and the convergence diagnostics of the
Markov chain are explained in Appendix I). We go on by discussing our first results
from the impulse responses in section 3.3, where we also try to identify different
fiscal-monetary regimes in the US. In addition, we identify and analyze the fis-
cal multipliers in the same section, and compare our findings to a fixed coefficient
structural Bayesian VAR. In section 3.4, we establish the importance of fiscal and
monetary shocks as drivers of output and the other variables in our model. Section
3.5 concludes.
2 Econometric Methodology
The method we use is a structural time varying vector autoregressive model (TVP-
VAR) with sign restrictions estimated on quarterly US data from 1979:I to 2012:II.
6
We allow for variation over time in the estimated coefficients of the model and in
the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals. This is a strong advantage over
fixed-parameter VARs as it allows us to capture any gradual structural shifts that
might occur in the economy at t = 1, . . . , T . Our results are derived from analyzing
(structural) impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompositions.
The flexibility of a TVP-VAR does not come without costs. The computational
burden increases rapidly with the number of endogenous variables, lags and the
set of identifying restrictions. To keep the amount of parameters and restrictions
manageable, we will restrict ourselves to five variables and two lags.5Moreover, we
identify the shocks randomly distributed only once within three specific regimes.
The first regime corresponds to the Volcker chairmanship (1979-1984); the other
two somewhat loosely to the Great Moderation (1985-2006) and Great Recession
(2007-2012). Although focusing on a few regimes instead of every t slightly restricts
the flexibility of the time varying approach but, on the other hand, such a focus can
be thought as a more elaborate subsample strategy. Primiceri (2005) has implicitly
taken and defended a similar route.
2.1 Model Specification
The k-vector of quarterly variables {yt}Tt=1 includes government spending, net taxes,
output, inflation and a short-term interest rate in that order. We assume yt =
(yg,t, yt,t, yx,t, ypi,t, yi,t)
′ evolves according to the TVP-VAR(p) process,
yt = Ct +B1,tyt−1 + · · ·+Bp,tyt−p + ut, (1)
in which Ct is a k× 1 vector of time varying intercepts, Bi,t (i = 1, . . . , p) is a k× k
matrix of time varying coefficients and ut are possibly heteroscedastic reduced-form
residuals with variance-covariance matrix Ωt. Iterating on (1) yields the correspond-
ing infinite moving average representation, i.e.
yt = µt +
∞∑
h=0
Θh,tut−h. (2)
5Primiceri (2005), and Cogley and Sargent (2005) employ a 3-variable monetary TVP-VAR.
Kirchner et al. (2010), Pereira and Lopes (2011), and Hauzenberger(2012) use a 4-variable fiscal
TVP-VAR. All these papers use two lags.
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Θ0,t = Ik, or a k dimensional identity matrix, µt =
∑∞
h=0 Θh,tCt and Θh,t = JB˜
h
t J
′
in which B˜t is the corresponding TVP-VAR(1) companion form of the TVP-VAR(p)
in (1) and J denotes a selector matrix:6
B˜t =
[
Bt
Ik(p−1) : 0k(p−1)×k
]
and J =
(
Ik : 0k×k(p−1)
)
. (3)
The parameters Θh,t for h = 1, . . . , H represent the reduced-form impulse response
functions. To transform these responses into ones with a structural interpretation
we proceed in two steps. First, we decompose the reduced-form variance matrix Ωt
in a standard triangular fashion and then, in a second step, we identify the structural
shocks through sign and other restrictions on the impulse responses. Specifically,
ut = A
−1
t ΣtGtεt (4)
in which εt are the normalized structural shocks (i.e. εt ∼ N(0, Ik)), At is lower
triangular with ones on the main diagonal;
At =

1 0 0 0
a21,t 1 0 0
...
. . . . . .
...
an1,t · · · ann−1,t 1,
 (5)
Σt is a diagonal matrix with entries σi,t (i = 1, . . . , k), or a matrix of uncorrelated
variances;
Σt =

σ1,t 0 0 0
0 σ2,t 0 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 σk,t,
 (6)
and Gt is an orthonormal rotation matrix. Given the properties of Gt and εt we can
write the decomposition of the reduced-form variance-covariance matrix as
Ωt = A
−1
t ΣtΣ
′
tA
−1′
t . (7)
6We will see in just a short while that IK = V (t).
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This is the first step in our transformation into structural impulse responses. There-
fore, combining 4 with the reduced-form impulse response function on the right-hand
side of 2, the structural impulse responses follow then from:
Φt =
(
Θ′0,t : · · · : Θ′H,t
)′
A−1t ΣtGt, (8)
in which we rotate the orthonormal matrix Gt until Φt satisfies all the imposed
restrictions, and the forecast error variance decomposition of yt can be extracted
from the diagonal elements of
Ω(y)h,t =
H∑
h=0
Θh,tΩtΘ
′
h,t. (9)
This is the second step. We have now identified the complete structural impulse
responses, including the forecast error variance decomposition. Let us continue by
re-writing the TVP-VAR (p) model 1.
For the estimation it will be practical to collect the slope coefficients Bt = (B1,t :
· · · : Bp,t) in a k × kp matrix and to transform it together with the constant into a
k(kp+ 1) vector of VAR coefficients by stacking the columns, i.e. βt = vec (Bt : Ct).
The model in (1) can now be rewritten as
yt = X
′
tβt + A
−1
t ΣtGtεt, (10)
X ′t =
(
y′t−1 : · · · : y′t−p : 1
)⊗ Ik,
in which the operator ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. Like the VAR coefficients,
we bring the non zero and one elements of the covariances At and volatilities Σt into
vector form: αt = (α21,t, α31,t, α32,t · · · , αk1,t, · · · , αkk−1,t)′ and σt = (σ1,t, · · · , σk,t)′
where the corresponding dimensions are k(k−1)/2 and k. This way of decomposing
the variance-covariance matrix in 10 is not unique to the TVP-VAR literature, but is
also widely applied in the literature considering the problem of efficiently estimating
covariance matrices.7
The vectors αt, βt, and σt summarize all the time varying parameters of the
model.8We have in effect transformed the TVAP-VAR(p) expression 1 into 10. In
7See Pourahamadi (2000), or Smith and Kohn (2002).
8In Cogley (2003), and Cogley and Sargent (2005), α is time invariant, meaning that an
innovation in the i-th variable has a time invariant effect on the j-th variable. However, our
purpose is to model time-variant simultaneous interactions of equations, which means that α must
be allowed to vary over time.
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effect, the new strategy is to model the coefficient processes in 10. As in Primiceri
(2005) we let the coefficients αt and βt evolve as random walks and the standard
deviation σt follows a geometric random walk:
αt = αt−1 + ζt (11)
βt = βt−1 + νt, (12)
log σt = log σt−1 + ηt. (13)
The specification for σt falls into the class of models known as stochastic volatility.
While in infinite samples a random walk hits an upper or lower bound for sure, the
use of finite samples makes it possible to maintain the random walk assumption. A
great advantage as we do not have to estimate additional parameters, although, in
principle, we could extend (11), (12) and (13) to represent more general autoregres-
sive processes.9
The innovations εt, ζt, νt, and ηt are mutually uncorrelated Gaussian white
noises with zero mean and variances defined by the identity matrix Ik and the
hyperparameters Q, S and W .10Summarized in the variance-covariance matrix V
we have:
V = Var


εt
νt
ζt
ηt

 =

Ik 0 0 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0
0 0 0 W
 , S =

S1 0 · · · 0
0 S2
. . .
...
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 Sk−1
 , (14)
S1 = Var([∆α21,t]
′) and Si−1 = Var([∆αi1,t, · · · ,∆αii−1,t]′) for all i = 3, . . . , k. All
matrices here, besides the identity matrix Ik, are positive definite. The rather
specific assumptions on the structure of V and S are standard in the literature
(see, e.g., Primiceri, 2005, and Canova and Gambetti, 2009) and are not essential to
keep the estimation feasible. The structure of V and S offers, however, numerous
advantages: most important for our purpose is that the block diagonality of S with
9Primiceri (2005) does extend the framework as a robustness check, and allows the coefficients
and log standard errors to follow a more general AR process (varying the AR coefficients between
0.5 and 0.95). He does, however, not find any significant differences for the model performance
compared to the random walk hypothesis. The only minor change is that the model captures,
apart from the permanent, many temporary variations in parameters. The temporary changes are,
nevertheless, irrelevant for the overall analysis.
10The priors for the model coefficients in 10 and hyperparameters are outlined and explained
in Appendix II.
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blocks corresponding to parameters in separate equations of the TVP-VAR enables
us to model [α21,t], [α31,t, α32,t] , . . . , [αk1,t, · · · , αkk−1,t] in linear state space form.
The advantage of linearity will become clear when we lay out the Bayesian estimation
strategy for our model. Also, assuming all off-diagonal elements to be zero does not
further exaggerate the curse-of-dimensionality problem (i.e. a very large number of
parameters) inherent in all time varying parameter models.
2.2 Identification
We use sign restrictions, summarized in Table A.1, to identify jointly four orthogonal
shocks: a business cycle shock which increases output and taxes; a monetary policy
shock which increases the interest rate and decreases inflation and output; a spend-
ing shock which increases spending and output; and a tax shock which increases
taxes and decreases output. In addition, there is a residual shock in this model.11
However, because it is not identified, it does not have a structural interpretation, and
therefore we do not report it. Moreover, sign restrictions are a partial identification
method and there is therefore no necessity to identify as many fundamental shocks
as variables in our model (see, e.g., Uhlig, 2005). All restrictions must hold for one
quarter, except for the responses of the variables which are directly associated to
the shock (e.g. tax shock on taxes), they must hold for two quarters. Having some-
what longer restrictions here rules out transitory effects. The signs of the restricted
responses are relatively uncontroversial and consistent with most dynamic general
equilibrium models and Keynesian aggregate supply and demand diagrams.12
Of course, such a strong view on the sign of the responses discards, at least
on impact, more controversial phenomena such as expansionary fiscal contractions
(see, e.g., Giavazzi et al., 2000) or the price puzzle. With our strong view we avoid
however some issues often criticized in the structural VAR literature, for example
the missing link between theory and a simple Choleski decomposition (i.e. a causal
ordering of the variables) or the weak information provided by sign restrictions if one
takes a too agnostic view on the identification of shocks (see, e.g., Canova and Pina,
2005, and Canova and Paustian, 2011). Being too agnostic may have especially
severe consequences if the relative variance of the shock of interest delivers a weak
11The residual shock can be viewed as innovation to inflation in ut.
12Canova and Pappa (2007), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), and Pappa (2009) apply a similar
identification scheme through sign restrictions to study the effects of fiscal policy, and Chadha et al
(2010) apply a similar scheme to a monetary policy framework.
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signal. The usual suspect here is the monetary policy shock. So the relatively large
number of theory driven restrictions and our rich shock structure should a-priori
lead to a good performance and reliability of our approach.
Although it is not of our primary interest, identifying a business cycle shock is
crucial to adequately track the source behind the fiscal shocks, especially on the tax
side (see, e.g., Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, and Mountford and Uhlig, 2009). In
this way we can disentangle whether a change in taxes comes from fluctuations in
output or a tax shock. Just as a remark, we do not differentiate between a demand
driven or supply driven business cycle shock; the results will, however, provide us
with an indication of the relevant driver in a particular regime.
In addition to restricting the signs we also impose magnitude restrictions. First,
we narrow down the elasticity of taxes to output in the matrix of contemporaneous
effects G′tΣ
−1
t At. Most papers in the tradition of Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
predetermine this elasticity, the one which essential separates tax and business cycle
shocks, at values somewhere around (minus) 2. Hauzenberger (2012) estimates time
varying elasticities over the last 45 years and finds values larger than zero but lower
than 3. Accordingly, we limit the respective coefficient in the G′tΣ
−1
t At matrix to
that range and in the same way we restrict the spending and tax multipliers to
be lower than 3 on impact. Such an upper restriction on the impact multiplier
is relatively liberal and captures most of the values found in the literature (e.g.,
Ramey, 2011, Romer and Romer, 2012, and Favero and Giavazzi, 2012). Kilian and
Murphy (2012) show how imposing plausible bounds effectively reduces the number
of admissible but empirically implausible models. Second, in certain cases it is not
possible to fully disentangle the four shocks by the restrictions in Table A.1. When
the candidate response for a spending shock implies an increase in taxes, it could also
represent a business cycle shock. Rather than discarding, and essentially imposing
a negative sign on the response of taxes to a spending shock, we disentangle the
two shocks through a relative magnitude restriction: a business cycle shock that
increases output by one-dollar must have a larger effect on taxes in absolute terms
than a one-dollar spending shock. The relative magnitude restriction must hold for
two quarters.13This procedure further helps in reducing the number of implausible
models (see, e.g., Dungy and Fry, 2009).
13Two quarters is a reasonable assumption since cyclical movements have a longer lasting impact
on taxes than spending. However, the results do not significantly change if the relative magnitude
restriction is applied only for one quarter. In any case, this assumption is much less restrictive
than the negative tax response restriction.
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We have started the project with the ambitious goal of identifying jointly the
four shocks in every period t. As it turned out, such a goal is computationally too
demanding and we therefore opted for a different strategy, identifying the shocks
only once within the three specific regimes of the Volcker chairmanship (1979-1984),
the Great Moderation (1985-2006) and the Great Recession (2007-2012).14Formally,
define S as the set of sign and magnitude restrictions, and let G
(r)
t be one orthonor-
mal rotation matrix in (8).15Then, to find one representative impulse response for
the Volcker Chairmanship,
ΦV =
(
Θ′0,t : · · · : Θ′H,t
)′
A−1t ΣtG
(r)
t , (15)
we randomly pick a quarter t from TV , TV + 1, . . . , TM − 1 and rotate G(r)t over r =
1, 2, . . . , R until there is one r such that S ⊂ ΦV ; and in the same way we search for
ΦM and ΦG in the Great Moderation and Great Recession with t ∈ (TM , . . . , TR−1)
and t ∈ (TR, . . . , T ). The specific dates defining the three regimes are TV ≡ 1979:I,
TM ≡ 1985:I and TR ≡ 2007:I. If we fail to find an admissible impulse response
within the maximum number R of allowed rotations, we pick a different t and start
our search again.
As a robustness check of our identification procedure we also run a recursive
scheme. It will be a pseudo recursive identification, to be precise, because we keep
rotating the two-by-two block of taxes and output to separate the tax and business
cycle shocks. Unlike spending and monetary policy shocks, which can be identified
by ordering spending first and the short-term interest rate last (see, e.g., Perotti,
2007, and Christiano et al., 2005) the other two shocks cannot be identified by
a simple causal ordering. Therefore, to have a better comparison with our main
identification procedure we keep the sign restrictions on the tax-output block.
2.3 Estimation
We estimate our TVP-VAR using Bayesian methods on quarterly data from 1979:I
to 2012:II for our five variables: government spending, net taxes, output, the in-
flation rate and a short-term interest rate. To keep our results comparable with
14Since our sample includes over 130 quarters, identifying all sign restrictions in each quarter
is computationally very demanding and results in many unstable draws. We therefore opt for the
alternative strategy outlined below, which moreover is standard in the TVP-VAR literature.
15G
(r)
t comes from a QR decomposition of a k × k standard normal matrix with the upper
triangular part normalized to be positive.
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Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and other studies in their tradition, we define the
fiscal variables in the same way: government spending includes both government
consumption expenditures and gross investment, and net taxes are the current re-
ceipts less net transfers and net interest paid. Note that these are not expressed
as ratios to GDP, but directly in levels (in order to facilitate the interpretation of
these variables to the various shocks). On the nominal side we measure inflation as
the quarterly change of the output deflator and use the 3-month T-bill rate as our
short-term interest variable; both are expressed in percent per quarter.16The three
variables on the real side of the economy enter the TVP-VAR as the logarithm of
their real, per-capita values.17The TVP-VAR is estimated in levels.18
Since we do not have a closed form solution for the posterior distribution of
the structural parameters we use a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm
for the numerical evaluation. Taking the Bayesian route together with somewhat
informative priors effectively deals with the large dimensionality of the TVP-VAR
compared to maximum likelihood techniques where it is hard to rule out peaks in
the likelihood in uninteresting regions of the parameter space. Estimation further
exploits the fact that it is typically easier to draw from a lower dimensional distribu-
tion, conditional on a set of parameters. Specifically, conditional sampling requires
to treat the VAR coefficients βt, the covariances αt and the volatilities σt as sepa-
rate blocks in a Gibbs sampler.19 Appendix B has a detailed exposition of our prior
choice and the sampling strategy.
The Gibbs sampler does not ensure that every single βt from a draw of the
sequence {βt}Tt=1 leads to a stable VAR representation. Cogley and Sargent (2005)
discard a draw as soon as they find a βt with eigenvalues larger than one in modulus.
Such a strict rule may not be practical here for two reasons: one is policy related
16Using the Federal Funds rate instead of the T-bill does not change the results.
17The data sources are the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). Specifically, NIPA
tables 1.1.4 (line 1), 1.1.5 (lines 1 and 21), 3.1 (lines 1, 9, 11, 15 and 22), 7.1 (line 18), and FRED
series TB3MS for the 3-month T-bill rate. All variables were downloaded on September 1, 2012.
18Mixing the I(0) and I(1) data for the Bayesian TVP-VAR estimation is not unusual in the
literature and has been applied by, amongst others, Kirchner et al (2010), and Nakajima (2011).
Another example is Christian et al (2005) who estimate their New-Keynesian model using Bayesian
methods and a mix of I(0) and I(1) data. We deal with it by imposing a mild stability condition
on the first differences. Specifically, we check the roots of the associated VECM polynomial of
the VAR and discard every draw that has more than k = 4 roots in or on the unit circle. See
Hauzenberger (2012) for more details on this transformation of the level TVP-VAR(p) in 1 and for
checking the roots.
19Gelman et al. (1995, Chap. 11) show that the stationary distribution of the Markov Chain
generated by the Gibbs sampler is the joint distribution one is looking for.
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and the other one is of statistical nature. Unlike monetary policy the objective of
fiscal policy does not necessarily lie in stabilization, and the use of spending, taxes
and output in levels basically rules out stability. It is therefore more practical to
impose a relatively weak condition on a quasi differenced version of the model in
which we transform the autoregressive coefficients in the spending, tax and output
equations to represent a specification in first differences.20
After a burn-in period of 50,000 iterations we start saving every third draw from
the joint posterior distribution until a total of 20,000. The “thinning” helps to break
the autocorrelation of successive draws; Appendix B.3 provides satisfactory conver-
gence diagnostics of the MCMC chains. All of the 20,000 saved draws must satisfy
the sign, magnitude and stability restrictions. Specifically, for each of the 20,000
draws we randomly pick a quarter from the Volcker period, the Great Moderation
and the Great Recession and generate the impulse responses from (15). As a result,
we get three distributions of impulse responses that are representative for the effects,
interactions and the transmission of fiscal and monetary policy in our three episodes.
In the discussion we will focus on the median as a summary measure. The median
is not uncontroversial: Fry and Pagan (2007) criticize the lost orthogonality prop-
erty of the shocks when the summary measure mixes different draws of admissible
models. Their remedy to restore orthogonality suggests to use the single model that
comes closest to the median. Canova and Paustian (2011) dig a little deeper into
the issue and find the median to be an acceptable summary measure, performing
reasonably well compared to Fry and Pagan’s (2007) close-to-median rule.
3 Fiscal and Monetary Interactions
We organize the discussion of the results in the following way. Section 3.1 discusses
the time variant volatility pattern of the estimated model coefficients. We continue
by analyzing the endogenous responses to business cycle, government spending, tax
and monetary policy shocks. A business cycle shock is defined as a shock that jointly
moves output and taxes in the same direction. This is an important assumption
because when output and taxes move in the same direction, we essentially assume
that this must be due to some improvement (deterioration) in the business cycle
generating the increase (fall) in taxes, not the other way around. Moreover, the
20See Hauzenberger (2012) for more details about imposing a weak stability rule on variables
in levels with an obvious trend.
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effect of the business cycle shock on taxes (in absolute terms) must be larger than
the effect of a spending shock for two consecutive quarters following the shock.
Identifying a business cycle shock is crucial to adequately track the source behind
the fiscal shocks, especially on the tax side (see, e.g., Blanchard and Perotti, 2002,
and Mountford and Uhlig, 2009). In this way we can differentiate between automatic
stabilizers and active policy decisions.21In addition, there is a fifth shock in this
model, a residual shock. However, because it is not identified, it does not have
a structural interpretation, and therefore we do not report it. Moreover, the sign
restrictions are a partial identification method and there is therefore no necessity
to identify as many fundamental shocks as variables in our model (see, e.g., Uhlig,
2005).
Our main interest is in detecting possible structural shifts in the economy, as
well as shifts in the application of both monetary and fiscal policy. In addition, we
hope to find sufficient evidence to determine when and whether the three policies
(monetary, spending, and tax) have stabilizing or destabilizing effects on output.
We compare our findings with the key results in the literature.
However, before we begin the discussion, we would also like to introduce some key
concepts that we will be making use of throughout the subsequent sections. The
first one refers to interaction and coordination of the two policies. Following the
large literature on policy interactions, if the two policies exhibit a positive or neg-
ative correlation (or a common cyclical pattern) implying that one policy responds
strategically to the actions of the other (in whatever direction), we say that the two
policies interact, or coordinate their responses. Going one level deeper and following
Muscatelli et al (2004), if the interaction has a positive correlation, we define the
two policies as being compliments. In contrast, if the two policies have a negative
correlation, then the two policies act as substitutes. Finally, the last level of policy
analysis regards the responses of the two policies to innovations in output, as in
Melitz (2002) and Muscatelli et al (2004). If the interest rate rises after a business
cycle shock, we say that the monetary policy acts in a stabilizing fashion. Likewise,
if taxes rise, or government spending falls following the same business cycle shock,
we equally say that the fiscal policy acts to stabilize output. Since we superimpose
via our identification scheme that taxes will always rise following a positive business
cycle shock, the final outcome on the fiscal side will therefore depend on the sign
21While we only consider the movements in total government revenues, and not in the marginal
tax rate textitper se, Baxter and King (1993) show that since the end of the war (1944-45), the
two have moved tightly together and thus can be viewed as the same thing.
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and the magnitude of responses of government spending.
3.1 Time Variant Volatility Patterns
Looking at Figure II.1, we can identify at least two periods of exceptionally high
volatility in the residuals of the TVP-VAR equations. The first one is at the be-
ginning of our sample period (1979-1984) which falls under the early Volcker period
(in line with the findings of Primiceri, 2005), when the interest rate and inflation
experienced their highest peak, as well as output and spending.22The second period
is during the Great Recession (2007-2012), when the volatility of taxes increased,
and that of output and spending to a certain extent. In the two decades preceding
it, the volatility of the two variables was maintained at a constant level. We should
therefore expect to see more volatility in impulse responses during those two peri-
ods compared to the Great Moderation (1985-2006). This is interpreted as a first
indication that there are these three regimes in our data.
3.2 Impulse Response Analysis
The impulse responses are reported for the three distinct periods in Figures II.2 to
II.5. The blue line with circles corresponds to the median response during the Vol-
cker era (1979-1984). The second represents the median response during the Great
Moderation (1985-2006), while the third is the median impulse response during the
Great Recession (2007-2012). We initially performed a fully flexible and time-variant
scheme, allowing the shocks to be identified in every quarter, but detected that most
time-variation occurred between the three regimes. Since minimal variation was ob-
served within those three regimes, and in order to keep our discussions focused, we
follow the approach by Primiceri (2005) and Kirchner et al. (2010), and in the same
figure report the representative (i.e. median) response for each regime.
The reader will notice that some impulse responses are reported in terms of
“percent or percentage deviations from trend”, while others are reported in terms
of “dollar deviations from trend”. The responses of output, spending and taxes to
a business cycle, spending and tax shock are therefore reported in terms of (non-
cumulative) multipliers (see Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, and Kirchner et al., 2010).
22Since output and spending are specified in levels in the estimations, we observe the increase in
volatility as an increase in level. Another possibility would have been to express the two variables
in quarterly growth rates, just as the interest rate and inflation, whereby we would observe a
similar peak in the former like we observe in the latter two.
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In other words, we convert the initial estimates of the variables we use in log-levels
output, spending and taxes from elasticities into derivatives by multiplying it with
the prevailing ratio of the responding and shocked variables. For the spending mul-
tiplier we can write this conversion as (the same conversion applies to the remaining
two variables):
∆Yt+h
∆Gt+h
=
Yt
Gt
∂logYt+h
∂logGt+h
, h = 0, 1, ..., H (16)
in which Yt and Gt are the levels of output and spending, H defines the impulse
response horizon, and the log-derivatives follow from (8). The prevailing ratio ( Yt
Gt
in
this case) is independently calculated for each regime by randomly selecting a quarter
within a regime (Volcker Chairmanship, Great moderation, and Great Recession
separately). Once a quarter in each regime which satisfies all the sign restrictions
has been located, the ratio is calculated based on the values obtained in that quarter.
Thus, the ratio is also time varying. The size of all shocks are normalized and
represent, depending on the units of the shocked and the response variable, either a
one dollar, percent or percentage point innovation.
The first thing to note is that there is significant time variation in the impulse
responses. The magnitudes in the responses differ considerably between the regimes.
Moreover, for government spending and monetary policy shocks, we observe a qual-
itative difference in responses besides the quantitative. This confirms our selection
of the three regimes (or economic structures) in our sample. This is in stark con-
trast to the findings of Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2005), and Koop
and Korobilis (2009) who find the majority of the time variation in the variance of
the residuals, but not in the TVP-VAR coefficients.23We believe that the disparity
in our results reflect the fact that we have included fiscal variables and shocks in
our model, thereby studying much richer dynamics. This explanation is supported
by the findings of Rossi and Zubairy (2011) described in the introduction. Also,
Kirchner et al. (2010) and Pereira and Lopes (2010) find significantly higher time
variation in the impulse responses in their fiscal TVP-VAR compared to a monetary
one.
Second, we observe minor differences between our sign-restriction approach and
the recursive. In most cases, there are only minor differences in magnitudes of the
responses, but qualitatively they are the same. The only exception is the monetary
policy shock, where we observe some differences between the two methods. There
23More recently, Kim and Yamamoto (2012) have found statistically significant evidence of time
varying coefficients in a simple monetary model.
18
are two reasons for that. The first is related to the weak impact of the monetary
policy shock. The literature on sign restrictions has found that without imposing
the restrictions on some of the variables in the model, the impact of the shock is
marginal. Therefore in order to generate the impact in line with the theoretical
literature, you need to impose plenty of sign restrictions on the model (Canova and
Paustian, 2011). In our case, we impose restrictions on three variables: output,
inflation, and the interest rate. This is of course absent in the recursive approach.
The second is related to the fact that in the recursive approach, the interest rate is
ordered last in the model, resulting in a lag on the impact of the monetary policy
shock on the remaining variables. This is, however, inconsistent with the theoretical
literature, which finds an immediate impact of monetary policy on the economy. In
this sense, our framework is more appropriate since we observe contemporaneous
effects of the monetary policy.
To summarize, our method comparison shows that our identification scheme is
consistent and robust. For most shocks, we only observe some minor differences in
the magnitudes of the impulse responses, which, taking into account that our shocks
are well identified, means that our results are reliable. Further, the advantages
derived from applying sign restrictions for a monetary policy shock indicate that
our method is preferred to the recursive. Let us now have a more detailed look at
each shock.
3.2.1 Business Cycle Shock
Figure 5 reports the impulse responses of each variable to a business cycle shock.
We do not ex ante differentiate between demand-side and supply-side business cycle
shocks. The responses of output, spending and taxes are expressed as dollar for
dollar (or level responses). Interest rate and inflation, on the other hand, are re-
ported in the standard form of percentage point changes. Recall that inflation and
the interest rate are expressed in quarterly growth rates. To get them into annual
growth rates, the impulse responses of those two variables should be multiplied by
4.
We observe significant variation in impulse responses over the three regimes.
Following an expansion in output, the interest rate is more responsive during the
Volcker period. The interest rate responds by 5 basis points (or 20 in annualized
terms) more compared to the Great Moderation, or 10 basis points (or 40 in annu-
alized terms) more than during the Great Recession, resulting in a lower inflation.
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Hence, we also observe the more expansionary monetary policy during the most re-
cent episode in our results. The fiscal policy is in relative terms more expansionary
during the Volcker era. While spending rises by more than in the two other peri-
ods, taxes rise by, on average, 0.1 dollar less. The business cycle shock is also very
persistent, and the responses of output continue to rise 3 quarters after the initial
shock in all three regimes.
As Muscatelli et al. (2004), we observe a complementarity between monetary and
fiscal policies. In all three regimes, the monetary policy is tightened as a response
to an expansion in output, and in parallel the fiscal policy is tightened, via higher
taxes.24Spending also increases, but the increase in taxes is much higher, hence
the overall impact is a tighter fiscal policy. Moreover, both the monetary and the
fiscal side react in a stabilizing way to contemporaneous output. However, as Melitz
(2002) we find that government spending (contrary to taxes) reacts in a destabilizing
fashion to innovations in output. Net stabilization of the fiscal side therefore only
occurs because of a larger reaction of taxes than expenditures.25
3.2.2 Government Spending Shock
We wish to examine two things in this section. First, we wish to establish possi-
ble structural shifts in the economy, and whether the government spending shock
changes over time. Second, we wish to understand the degree of policy interactions
under a government spending shock. The responses of output, government spending
and taxes are reported as dollar (or level) responses to a one-dollar spending shock.
As guidance in interpreting our results in Figure 5, we use the findings from
Rossi and Zubairy (2011) on the effects of a government spending shock in a time-
invariant VAR framework. They find that an increase in government spending leads
to a minor increase in output (by approximately 20 percent of the size of the initial
shock), a fall in interest rate, and a fall in the inflation rate. Our time varying
exercise suggests that the expansion is similar, by between 1 and 1.25 dollars to
a one dollar increase in spending for much of the sample period. Taxes also rise
to finance the increase in public spending, but by less than the initial increase in
24The relative magnitude restriction may partially be responsible for this response. Nevertheless,
since we do not impose a restriction on the reaction of spending, nor a full restriction on magnitude
restriction on taxes, we largely allow the data to guide us in the interpretation.
25The magnitude restriction on taxes following a business cycle shock is very broad, which
means that the magnitude of tax response to an innovation in output has been fully data driven.
Therefore the final result we get for the fiscal side can be seen as empirically driven.
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public spending. In contrast to Rossi and Zubairy (2011), our inflation rate increases
marginally, by between 0.01 and 0.05 percentage points (0.04 to 0.1 in annualized
terms), which triggers a reaction of the monetary authority. They increase the rate
by approximately 0 to 0.01 percentage points (0 to 0.04 in annualized terms) for
most of the sample period. During the Volcker period, however, the response was
stronger, with a rise of up to 0.035 percentage points (or 0.14 in annualized terms).
As a result of the stronger monetary policy reaction during the Volcker era, the
inflation was slightly negative, despite the initial expansion on the fiscal side. On
the other hand, the relative laissez-faire attitude of the latest regime results in the
highest inflation rate for the entire sample period.
One explanation for the slight expansionary monetary policy during the Great
Recession is that because spending policy is less effective during this period, the
monetary policy needs to provide the initial stimulus in order to sustain the impact
of the fiscal expansion, and prevent a more drastic fall of output to trend. Hence,
both the fiscal and monetary policies were coordinating their actions in order to
prevent a rapid contraction in output.
Turning to the nature of policy interactions, we observe two things. During the
Volcker period and the Great Moderation, the monetary policy and government
spending act initially as substitutes, meaning that when government spending in-
creases, the interest rate is increased. 3 quarters after the initial shock, the interest
rate starts to fall, while spending decreases. On the other hand, during the Great
Recession, the two policies have acted as compliments. A fiscal expansion has been
accompanied by a monetary policy expansion.
3.2.3 Tax Shock
Let us next examine a positive one-dollar tax shock. Similar to the government
spending shock, we wish to both uncover structural shifts as well as examine the
level of policy interactions during our sample period. Figure 5 reports the relevant
impulse responses. The responses of output, government spending and taxes are
expressed as dollar for dollar (or level responses). Interest rate and inflation, on the
other hand, are reported in the standard form of percentage point changes.
To guide the interpretation of our results, we will contrast our findings to Mount-
ford and Uhlig (2009), which in many aspects is similar to our framework. In re-
sponse to a 2 percent tax increase which lasts for a year after the initial shock, they
find that output decreases by 0.6 percent 11 quarters out, government spending falls
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by 0.7 percent after 7 quarters, while (counter-intuitively authors admit) price levels
increase by up to 0.3 percent until quarter 10, and the interest rate rises by around
0.3 percentage points before it start falling after 7 quarters.. Our findings are strik-
ingly similar to Mountford and Uhlig (2009). For most of the sample period, the
decrease in taxes leads to an rise in output between 0.9 and 1.3 dollars. Spending
also rises by up to 0.2 dollars. Analogous to Mountford and Uhlig (2009), inflation
goes down by between 0.02 and 0.025 percentage points.26The interest rate initially
rises by 0.01 percentage points (0.04 in annualized terms), but starts falling imme-
diately thereafter to −0.02 percentage points (−0.08 percent in annualized terms)
in order to correct for the falling inflation. Since these responses are similar to the
endogenous responses to a positive technology shock in a standard New-Keynesian
model, this suggest that a tax reduction improves the supply side efficiency in pro-
duction, possibly via a lower tax-burden on profits, leading to higher re-investment,
and lower production costs. In all regimes, we observe a very persistent response of
output to a negative tax shock, even in the medium-run (or 20 quarters after the
shock).
Nevertheless, we see significant variations in the medium/long-run responses
between the three regimes. Whereas the impact response of output is between 0.9
and 1 in all three periods, 5 quarters after the initial shock, they deviate remarkably.
During the Great Recession, the medium-run response of output is persistent, but
only 1.2 dollars. For the Great Moderation, it is 1.4 dollars, while for the Volcker
period, it is considerably higher at 1.8 dollars. At the same time, the impact on
spending is the least during the Volcker period, with an increase of only 0.1 dollars,
while it is twice as high during the Great Recession. Taking into account that the
fall in inflation was the highest during Volcker period, of 0.025 percentage points (0.1
percent in annualized terms), and lowest during the Great Recession, this implies
that the tax reforms, would have been the most efficient during the Volcker regime,
and in relative terms the least efficient during the most recent recession. Our first
results point in the direction that the tax cuts, for one reason or another do not
have the same strong impact if implemented today. We will explore this point in
more detail below when we discuss the multipliers.
Looking into policy coordination, the two policies behave as substitutes. Con-
trary to all the other shocks, however, both fiscal policies are substitutes to the
monetary policy. An initial fall in taxes is accompanied by a rise in spending, which
26Or 0.08 and 0.1 percent in annualized terms.
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leads the monetary authority to increase the interest rate. As soon as the expansion-
ary fiscal policy reverts, and taxes start to rise and spending to fall, the monetary
policy is loosened, and 1 year after the initial shock, it turns below its trend.
3.2.4 Monetary Policy Shock
To conclude our impulse response section, let us analyze the responses to a positive
monetary shock. Figure 5 reports the results. In a time invariant VAR model with
both fiscal and monetary variables, Rossi and Zubairy (2011) find that a positive
monetary shock leads to a contraction in output of almost the same magnitude as
the initial shock, a rise in government spending of less than 10 percent of the initial
shock, and initially a rise in inflation, but then after 4 quarters a fall (indicating a
transmission friction to prices). While our results point in the same direction, there
are some differences. The contraction in output is significantly smaller at around
0.05 dollars for a 1 percent rise in the interest rate. Similarly, government spending
falls in our responses, while they rise in the case of Rossi and Zubairy (2011). Lastly,
the transmission friction does not appear in our results since the inflation is very
responsive to the interest rate rise, and falls immediately.
Nevertheless, we observe considerable time variation in the responses. During
the Volcker period, the fiscal side does (almost) not react to the contractionary
effects of the interest rate rise, resulting in a much longer recovery of output than
in the other regimes. This is in line with the change in policy of the Fed in 1982,
from targeting M1 to implicit inflation targeting, when their priority was to bring
the inflation under control, which they succeeded better than in any other regime,
from our impulse responses.
On the other end, we have the most recent regime. The rise in interest rate is
followed by a contractionary (but very active) fiscal policy, since the fall in gov-
ernment spending is higher than the fall in taxes (the similar is true for the Great
Moderation). The result is a stronger reduction on the demand side, leading to
a more enhanced fall in output, and inflation compared to the other two regimes.
The fall in inflation during the Great Recession is almost twice the fall of the Great
Moderation, or 4 times the fall of the Volcker period. Nonetheless, the monetary au-
thorities revert their decision after the third quarter, and the interest rates start to
sharply fall, ending at (negative) 0.75 percentage points (or 3 in annualized terms)
below the trend. The consequence is that output recovers more quickly from the
initial contraction in Great Recession compared to the previous regimes.
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Regarding the nature of interactions between monetary and fiscal authorities,
we observe differences over time. While for the Great Moderation, and (to a smaller
extent) the Great Recession, a contractionary monetary policy is followed by a net
contractionary fiscal policy (fall in spending is higher than the fall in taxes), during
the Volcker period, we observe the opposite. Hence, the two policies are substitutes
during the Volcker regime, while they became compliments ever since. Muscatelli
et al. (2004) find the two policies to be compliments under a monetary shock.
3.3 The Fiscal Multipliers
The second thing we wish to examine in the paper is the fiscal transmission chan-
nel. One of the advantages with our framework is that we are able to disentangle
monetary policy from our fiscal policy, which permits us to study the impact of
fiscal spending on economic cycles. In addition, we allow for the fiscal transmission
channel to vary over time. Finally, we separate the government spending multiplier
from its’ tax counterpart.
3.3.1 The (Government) Spending Multiplier
Figure 5 depicts the (government) spending multiplier for the 1979:I-2012:II period.
Because the impulse responses of output, government spending and taxes are already
reported as dollar (or level) responses to a one-dollar government spending shock,
we can directly interpret the response of output as the (non-cumulative) spending
multiplier.
2 periods after the initial one-dollar spending shock, we find the (peak) multiplier
to reach 1.25 dollars. These results are identical to Rotemberg and Woodford (1992),
who for the postwar period find the multiplier to be 1.25. Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) find very similar values in their SVAR analysis with spending ordered first.
Cavallo (2005), Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005), Perotti (2007), and Pereira and
Lopes (2010) find it to be above 1. The slight difference with the latter might be
due to the fact that we include both fiscal and monetary variables in our analysis.
Following the one dollar spending increase, taxes rise to under 0.2 dollars for 2
periods, but start sharply falling thereafter. In a theoretical model of Baxter and
King (1993), Smets and Wouters (2007), or Davig and Leeper (2010) government
spending can significantly crowd out the private spending and investment if higher
taxes are expected in the future, in particular income taxes, which on the demand
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side create strong negative wealth effects, and on the supply side induce less private
capital investments and lower labor inputs. In such instances, output can even fall
in response to higher government purchases. However, since taxes in our sample
only marginally rise at the beginning and sharply fall thereafter, the crowding out
is small (or negligible), and therefore we see a spending multiplier closer to the
Keynesian ones, as in Romer and Bernstein (2009).
However, the largest difference in time lies in the medium-term impact of the
multiplier. Whereas in the Great Recession and Great Moderation, the fiscal mul-
tiplier decays after 2 quarters, and the spending effects are neutralized after 10 to
12 quarters, during the Volcker regime, the multiplier is much more persistent. 20
quarters after the initial shock, the multiplier is around 0.7, implying a long-lasting
impact of government spending in the early 1980’s. In terms of the model out-
comes of Baxter and King (1993), this would imply that the government purchase
program in early 1980’s was permanent and/or investment (rather than purchase)
oriented. They find that permanent changes in government spending are associated
with larger and longer-lasting output effects because of higher long-run labor input
on the steady-state capital stock, and that permanent increases in public invest-
ment induce long-run increases in private consumption and investment, since the
marginal product schedules for private labor and capital change over time (stimu-
lating increases in labor input and private capital).
To sum up, the US impact multiplier has overall lied somewhere between 1.1
and 1.25 dollars, decaying 2 quarters after the initial spending increase. Our results
are very similar to the findings of Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), and also in line with Perotti (2007) and Pereira and Lopes
(2010), who find the multiplier to be above one. One reason for why we find a
high multiplier in our data is the very small crowding out effects of future taxes on
private consumption and investment, which indicates that our multiplier is closer to
the Keynesian estimates. During the Volcker regime, however, the multiplier was
much more persistent, and even 20 quarters after the spending shock, the multiplier
was around 0.7. This means that the government spending in early 1980’s was
long-run- and/or investment-oriented.
3.3.2 The Tax Multiplier
Figure 5 depicts the (non-cumulative) tax multiplier for the 1979:I-2012:II period.
Just as before, the impulse responses of output, government spending and taxes are
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reported as dollar for dollar (or level) responses to a tax shock, meaning that we can
directly interpret the response of output as the (non-cumulative) tax multiplier.
For all three regimes, the impact multiplier is between 0.9 and 1 dollar, with the
lower end appearing during the most recent crises. This is significantly lower than
the Romer and Romer (2010) tax multiplier, who find as high value as 3, but Favero
and Giavazzi (2012) show that when you perform the same analysis in a multivariate
framework, the tax multiplier becomes considerably lower.
However, a closer look at the delayed multiplier reveals a much richer dynamics.
While for all periods, the multiplier is persistent and rises, the magnitudes are con-
siderably different. In particular, during the Volcker period, the delayed multiplier
reaches 1.8 dollars 4 years after the initial shock. On the other end, the multiplier
rises to ‘just’ 1.2 dollars 4 years after the initial shock during the Great Recession.
Therefore we conclude that the efficiency of the tax policy varies significantly over
time. Nevertheless, the tax multiplier is more persistent than the spending multi-
plier, and does not only have significant immediate impact, but its medium-term
effects are far-reaching. These results match the conclusions made by Mountford
and Uhlig (2009). Using a range of policy-based scenario studies, they find that
the deficit-financed tax cuts are most efficient in expanding the economy, with a
maximal present value multiplier of 5 dollars of total additional output per each
dollar of the total cut in government revenue 5 years after the shock.
One reason for why we find the tax cuts to be more efficient can be the crowding-
in effects that such a policy creates. Cuts in taxes, in particular income taxes, result
in higher private consumption and investment, independent of the purchase policy
that the government pursues. This is because there is a ‘supply-side multiplier’ at
work, by which decreases in tax rates rise the labor input, resulting in a n increase
in output, which in turn relaxes the tax burden on private agents in the subsequent
period. The velocity of the ‘supply-side multiplier’ will depend on the labor-supply
and tax elasticity (Baxter and King, 1993).
In terms of the medium/long-run multipliers (spending and taxes) during reces-
sions (with respect to expansions), we do not get a clear pattern. While we only
identify the multiplier once within every regime, we can still contrast the Great
Moderation as a regime with a mainly expansionary economy to the mainly re-
cessionary of the Volcker Chairmanship, and the Great Recession.27We find that
27We do not have a clear-cut multiplier in recessions versus expansions, since each regime iden-
tified in the paper contains periods of expansions and recessions. Nevertheless the Volcker chair-
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whereas both multiplier have been the highest during the Volcker chairmanship,
they have been the lowest over the Great Recession.28Since both multipliers show
the same difference over time and taking into account that during the latest reces-
sion, the policy rate has been at its zero lower-bound for most of the regime, it might
mean that the efficiency of the current government policies has been reduced since
private agents might expect that the reversal of government might occur very soon
(Corsetti et al, 2010).29 Alternatively, the government expansion (and subsequent
government contraction to finance it) is not perceived as temporary and therefore
is expected to remain after the interest rate rise (Woodford, 2010), or because the
economy is in a liquidity trap which means that the private agents believe that the
economy is in a worse state than it really is (Mertens and Ravn, 2010).30Another
possible explanation for the relatively lower fiscal multiplier during the Great Re-
cession might be structural. Since the structure of the economy has shifted since the
Volcker chairmanship, the government purchase and tax-reduction programs which
were effective then might be, in relative terms, less effective today since they cause
higher crowding-out effects, or the current fundamental problems are financial rather
than demand/supply-side which implies that government spending increases/tax re-
ductions have a smaller biting effect on the economy. Note, however, that this
observation is simply in relative terms between the three regimes, which suggests
that tax reductions are more effective in expanding output than spending increases
still holds.
3.4 The Time Invariant Model
The dashed lines superimposed in Figures 5 to 5 represents the time invariant esti-
mates for each shock, i.e. the median impulse response over the entire sample period.
They are calculated using a fixed parameters structural Bayesian VAR (BVAR),
where the coefficients βt and the volatility A
−1
t ΣtGt in 10 are time-invariant. Tak-
manship (1979-1984) and the Great Recession (200t-2012) can be considered regimes of recession,
since a large share of that regime was characterized by recessions, while the Great Moderation can
be considered as mainly an expansionary regime. This division is however, only indicative.
28Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) go as far as finding a negative long-run multiplier (-0.42) from
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
29Since the size of the expansionary package in 2009/10 has been so high, the private agents
expect a much higher reduction in spending, or increases in taxes very soon, which means that the
initial effects of fiscal expansion are reduced, since agents anticipate this.
30There is however no consensus in the theoretical and empirical literature regarding the efficacy
of the fiscal stimulus under a zero-lower bound. For a good overview of the debate, please see
Auerbach et al (2010).
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ing into account the issue of high dimensionality in parameter estimation in the
time-varying VAR, with this exercise we wish to contrast whether a fixed-coefficient
BVAR (that does not have issues of high-dimensionality) qualitatively and quan-
titatively produces similar results to a TVP-VAR, and can therefore be used as a
good substitute. For this reason, we will concentrate the discussion only on the
discrepancy of these results to the time-varying version.
The first thing is that we omit a lot of intertemporal dynamics by considering
the time-invariant impulse response. It will either represent the median of the three
periods, or over represent one regime at the expense of the other. Let us expand on
this point in further detail.
In a time-invariant version, the (government) spending multipliers would be un-
derestimated compared to a time-varying one. Similarly, the tax multiplier would
be overestimated for the Great Moderation and the Great Recession, while it would
be underestimated for the Volcker period. This means that the effectiveness of a tax
reduction on output would be ranked lower in a time invariant model.
On policy interactions, we note a similar divergence in results. Whereas we
conclude that for a government spending shock, the fiscal and monetary policies act
as substitutes during the Volcker and the Great Moderation regimes, we find that
they act as compliments during the Great Recession. By simply running a time
invariant version, we would conclude that the two policies behave as substitutes,
omitting thus the richer dynamics over time. Likewise, from a time-invariant model,
we would deduce that the two policies behave as compliments, if anything. However,
introducing time dynamics leads us to conclude that while the complementarity of
the two policies holds for the Great Moderation and the Great Recession, it is the
opposite for the Volcker period. Finally, though qualitatively the nature of policy
interactions is the same for the time variant and time invariant models, the results
from the time invariant one would lead us to overestimate somewhat the degree of
substitution.
To conclude, the discussion has showed that a lot of time-varying dynamics in
the economy is omitted if the time-invariant model is considered. While estimating
a fixed-coefficient BVAR takes shorter-time, it is nevertheless a bad substitute to
the time-varying version, since it drops out a lot of quantitative and qualitative
information.
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4 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of the
US Economy
To understand the fundamental forces that explain the fluctuations in the US econ-
omy, we perform a variance decomposition exercise. Just as for the impulse re-
sponses, we allow the economic structure to vary over time, thus allowing for al-
ternating dynamics in the composition of shocks that drive the variances. The
decompositions are calculated for each regime in the sample, as well as for horizons
1, 4, 8, and 20 quarters (representing the short-term and medium-term impact of
shocks). As Rossi and Zubairy (2011) point out, the drivers of the variance in the
short-run might be different from the medium-run, hence why we consider different
horizons. We decompose our variables into four shocks: Business cycle, spending,
taxes and monetary policy. Table 1 report the corresponding decompositions. As
a robustness check, we have also included the variance decomposition using the re-
cursive method in Table 2. Since we get the same results for both methods, we
conclude that results based on the sign restrictions is robust, and concentrate our
discussions on them, without further reference on the recursive method.
4.1 Decomposition on the Real Side
The fiscal shocks, tax and spending, are the strongest short and medium-term drivers
of US output. Together they account for between 60 and 70 percent of the variation
in output for all horizons. Reconnecting with our previous discussion that the tax
shock behaves similarly to a technology shock and spending shock as a demand side
shock, then it is not surprising that they explain the majority of the movement
in output. Moreover, because we do not differentiate between a supply-side and
demand-side business cycle shock, it is possible that the effects of both are cancel-
ing out, hence why the business cycle shock only explains 10 to 12 percent of the
variation. We do not note any significant differences in the shock contributions over
time for output.
Turning to public spending, not surprisingly, the government spending shock is
the strongest driver of spending for all 3 regimes, and all horizons. The govern-
ment spending shock explains between 40 and 50 percent of the spending volatility,
depending on the horizon that we consider. The tax shock is the second most im-
portant during the Volcker period, and the Great Recession, while monetary policy
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is during the Great Moderation. A possible reason for this difference is that the
stability of monetary policy during the Great Moderation allowed the government
to borrow more than usual since the interest rate risk was almost inexistent, and
the government did not have to worry about strongly fluctuating borrowing costs.
This does not, however, hold for the Volcker regime and the Great Recession, since
the short-term interest rate changed dramatically, and the risks in government bor-
rowing were much higher. Lastly, the minor importance of the business cycle shock
in explaining spending variation can be interpreted as the existence of inertias and
path-dependencies in the government spending decisions, implying that they are not
primarily cycle driven.
Continuing with taxes, the general pattern is, not entirely shocking, that the tax
shock is the strongest driver of the variance in taxes, followed by monetary policy,
spending and finally business cycle shock. The strong importance of monetary policy
for taxes can be interpreted as tax authorities taking into account the central bank
decisions when taking their decision on tax policies.
Over the medium run, specifically at horizon 20, the shock contributions alter
slightly, and spending becomes the second most important driver of taxes.
Strikingly, we find that the government spending shock explains less of the vari-
ation in taxes, than the tax shock does for the variation in spending. This indicates
that government spending decisions are made taking into account the government
revenue side, but tax decisions are taken independently of spending. Since we ob-
serve a rise in the importance of the government spending shock in the variation of
taxes over the medium term, this might also indicate that there is a time lag be-
tween tax and spending decisions, and hence there is a delayed effect of government
spending decisions on taxes (Pereira, 2008). In any case, taxes seem to play a more
important role for decisions on government spending than the other way around.
4.2 Decomposition on the Nominal Side
The fundamental drivers of inflation are the same for the three regimes. Business
cycle shock is the most important driver. However, for the subsequent ones, there
is more variation over horizons. Whereas in the short-run (horizon 1), tax shocks
is the most important in explaining inflation movements (15 to 19 percent), for
the medium-run (horizons 4, 8, and 20), government spending shock becomes more
significant, explaining around 18 percent of the inflation movement, while the signif-
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icance of the tax shock decreases.31Further, the importance of the monetary policy
shock rises as we increase the horizons, meaning that the lagged impact on prices is
stronger than the contemporaneous one. This implies that the effects of fiscal policy
on prices is quicker than that of monetary policy, which highlights the frictions in
the monetary pass-through.
To conclude, let us analyze the shock composition of the interest rate variance
over time. The business cycle shock is the most significant driver, followed by the
fiscal variables, taxes and spending. This indicates that the interest rate move-
ments are mainly cycle driven, which is in line with Gerba (2012), who finds that
the T-bill rate is highly procyclical, with a correlation to output of 0.98. The rela-
tively high importance of fiscal shocks in explaining interest rate movements points
again towards policy interactions between the two authorities, since the central bank
considers fiscal decisions when deciding on the interest rate target.32
Perhaps the most surprising is that the monetary policy shock explains the least
movements in the interest rate. However, our findings are in line with Uhlig (2005),
who interprets the monetary policy shock as accidental errors of the Fed, thus the
reason why the shock has a weak explanatory power.
5 Conclusions
The TVP-VAR methodology has been gaining ground over the past years. Whereas
the original developers of the method, Cogley and Sargent (2005), and Primiceri
(2005), used it to investigate the evolution of the US monetary policy, a few pa-
pers have used the method to conduct similar study on fiscal policy. Yet, as Rossi
and Zubairy (2011) point out, one needs to consider jointly the monetary and fiscal
shocks and condition both policies on each other in order to produce unbiased es-
timates. In addition, a solid identification scheme of shocks using sign restrictions
is necessary if one wishes to separate the effects from a set of shocks. We combine
all three methodological advances in our examination of the fiscal-monetary policy
interactions in the US since 1980, and analyze mainly three aspects. First, we look
at the evolution of the US economic structure and identify possible structural shifts,
both in terms of the shock structures and the endogenous responses to those shocks.
Second, we investigate the US fiscal-monetary interplays and establish various coor-
31Similar observations are made in Rossi and Zubairy (2011).
32The two fiscal shocks together explain between 17 and 30 percent of the interest rate volatility.
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dination regimes. Third, we examine the fiscal transmission channel and determine
the efficiency of fiscal policy in stabilizing output.
The paper makes four principal contributions. First, we observe significant time
variation in the model parameters (and error volatilities) between 1979 and 2012.
All our results confirm that there are three regimes in US economy: the Volcker
chairmanship (1979-84), the Great Moderation (1985-2007), and the Great Reces-
sion (2008-12). Second, impulse responses show that there are significant interac-
tions between monetary and fiscal policies over time. Depending on the shocks and
time period considered, we observe significant differences. Third, decomposition of
forecast error variance in spending shows that spending itself is largely acyclical,
indicating strong inertias and path-dependencies in government spending decisions.
In addition, we find that while government revenues largely influence decisions on
government spending, government spending does not influence tax decisions. Fourth
and final, our analysis of the fiscal transmission channel reveals two things. Tax cuts,
because of their crowding-in effects, are more efficient in expanding the economy than
government spending rises, since the tax multiplier is higher and more persistent. In
light of the current recession, the fiscal authorities should therefore concentrate their
efforts on cutting taxes. Coupled with the currently very accommodative monetary
policy, it does not only result in a significant short-run expansion of output, but the
impact is long-lasting and increasing, since the medium/long-run multiplier has been
1.2 during the Great Recession (2007-12). If authorities manage the expectations
of the private agents, the expansionary effects of tax cuts might be even larger, as
they were during the Volcker chairmanship when the medium/long-run multiplier
was 1.8. Taking into account that the interest rate is at its zero lower bound, the
authorities will need to carefully manage the expectations of the private agents and
strike a balance between the agents perceiving the tax cuts as temporary (and not to
be perceived as if they will remain beyond the period over which monetary policy is
constrained by the zero lower bound) and them not expecting a too rapid reversal in
the tax cuts (which would counteract the positive effects from the initial tax cuts).
The final success of tax cuts will, however, depend on the delicate management of
private agent expectations jointly by the two authorities.
Using recently developed (single and multiple) structural break tests such as An-
drews (1993), Nyblom (1989), Elliott and Mu¨ller (2006), and Bai and Perron (1998),
future research should validate the structural shifts identified here and examine
whether in 1984-85 the US economy underwent a structural break, and whether the
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same re-occurred in 2008. Finally, it would be interesting to extend our framework
to counterfactuals, possibly by using a DSGE-model that accommodates for the two
policies, and discuss the optimal combination of fiscal-monetary policies in order to
achieve certain macroeconomic targets. Fernandez-Villaverde et al (2011) is a first
step in this direction.
References
[1] Anderson, B. D. O. and Moore, J. B. (1979). Optimal Filtering. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
[2] Andrews, D. W. K. (1993). “Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural
Change with Unknown Change Point”, Econometrica, 61(4): 821–856.
[3] Annicchiarico B., Giammarioli N., and Piergallini A. (2012), “Budgetary Poli-
cies in a DSGE Model with Finite Horizons”, Research in economics 66 (2):
111-130
[4] Arduini, T., de Arcangelis, G. and Del Bello, C. L. (2012). “Balance-of-
Payments Crises During the Great Recession: Is this Time Different?” Review
of International Economics, 20(3): 517–534.
[5] Auerbach, A. J., Gale, W. G., and Harris, B. H. (2010), “Activist Fiscal Policy”,
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(4): 141–63.
[6] Auerbach, A. and Gorodnichenko, Y. (2012). “Measuring the Output Effects of
Fiscal Policy.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(2): 1–27.
[7] Bai, J. and Perron, P. (1998). “Estimating and Testing Linear Models with
Multiple Structural Changes.” Econometrica, 66: 47–78.
[8] Baxter, M., and King, R. (1993), “Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium” Amer-
ican Economic Review, 83(3): 315–34.
[9] Baxter, M., and King, R. (1999). “Measuring the Business Cycle: Approxi-
mate Band-Pass Filters for Economic Time Series.” Review of Economics and
Statistics, 81(4): 575–593.
33
[10] Blanchard, O. and Perotti, R. (2002). “An Empirical Characterization of the
Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes in Output.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4): 1329–1368.
[11] Canova, F. and Ciccarelli, M. (2009). “Estimating Multicountry VAR Models.”
International Economic Review, 50(3): 929–959.
[12] Canova, F. and Gambetti, L. (2009). “Structural Changes in the US Economy:
Is there a Role for Monetary Policy?” Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 33(2): 477–490.
[13] Canova, F. and Pappa, E. (2007). “Price Differentials in Monetary Unions: The
Role of Fiscal Shocks.” Economic Journal, 117(520): 713–737.
[14] Canova, F., and Paustian, M. (2011), “Business Cycle Measurement With Some
Theory”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(4): 345–61.
[15] Canova, F. and Pina J. (2005), “What VAR Tell Us About DSGE Models”,
in C. Diebolt and C. Kyrtsou (eds.) New Trends in Macroeconomics 89-124,
Springer Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg
[16] Carter, C. K. and Kohn, R. (1994). “On Gibbs Sampling for State Space Mod-
els.” Biometrika, 81(3): 541–553.
[17] Cavallo, M. (2005). “Government Employment and the Dynamic Effects of
Fiscal Policy Shocks. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper
2005–16.
[18] Chadha, J. S., Corrado, L., and Sun, Q. (2010), “Money and Liquidity Ef-
fects: Separating Demand From Supply”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 34(9): 1732–47.
[19] Chadha, J.S. and Nolan, C. (2007). “Optimal Simple Rules for the Conduct of
Monetary and Fiscal Policy”, Journal of Macroeconomics, (29): 665–689
[20] Christiano, L. C., Eichenbaum, M., and Evans, C. L. (2005). “Nominal Rigidi-
ties and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy.” Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 113(1): 1–45.
[21] Cogley, T. (2003), “How Fast Can the New Economy Grow? A Bayesian Anal-
ysis of the Evolution of Trend Growth, University of California, Davis, mimeo.
34
[22] Cogley, T. and Sargent, T. J. (2005). “Drift and Volatilities: Monetary Policies
and Outcomes in the Post WWII US.” Review of Economic Studies, 8(2): 262–
302.
[23] Corsetti, G., Kuester, K., Meier, A., and Mller, G. (2010), “Debt Consolidation
and Fiscal Stabilization of Deep Recessions”, Unpublished mimeo
[24] Davig, T. and Leeper, E. M. (2011). “Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions and
Fiscal Stimulus.” European Economic Review, 55(2): 211–227.
[25] Drautzburg, T., and Uhlig, H. (2011), “Fiscal Stimulus and Distortionary Tax-
ation”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. w17111
[26] Dungey, M. and Fry, R. (2009). “The Identification of Fiscal and Monetary
Policy in a Structural VAR.” Economic Modelling, 26(6): 1147–1160.
[27] Eichenbaum, M. and Fisher J.D.M. (2005). “Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of
9/11. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 37(1): 1-22.
[28] Elliott, G. and Mu¨ller, U. K. (2006). “Efficient Tests for General Persistent
Time Variation in Regression Coefficients.” The Review of Economic Studies,
73: 907–940.
[29] Fatas, A., and Mihov, I. (2001). “The Effects of Fiscal Policy on Consumption
and Employment: Theory and Evidence.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2760.
[30] Fatas, A. and Mihov, I. (2003). “On Constraining Fiscal Policy Discretion in
EMU.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19(1): 112–131.
[31] Favero, C., and Giavazzi, F. (2012). “Measuring Tax Multipliers: The Narra-
tive Method in Fiscal VARs.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
4(2): 69–94.
[32] Fernandez-Villaverde, J., Guerron-Quintana P.A., Kuester K., and Rubio-
Ramirez J. (2011), “Fiscal Volatility Shocks and Economic Activity” NBER
Working Paper No. 17317
[33] Fisher, J. D. M. and Peters, R. (2010). “Using Stock Returns to Identify Gov-
ernment Spending Shocks.” Economic Journal, 120(544): 414–436.
35
[34] Fragetta, M. and Kirsanova, T. (2007). “Strategic Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Interactions: An Empirical Investigation.” http://ssrn.com/abstract=986198.
[35] Franta, M. (2011). “Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks in Japan Using
Sign Restrictions within the TVP-VAR Framework.” IMES Discussion Paper
No. 2011-E-13.
[36] Fry, R. and Pagan, A. (2007). “Some Issues in Using Sign Restrictions for
Identifying Structural VARS.” NCER Working Paper No. 14.
[37] Gelfand, Alan E. and Smith, A. F. M. (1990). “Sampling-Based Approaches to
Calculating Marginal Densities.” Journal of the American Statistical Associa-
tion, 85(410):398–409,
[38] Gali, J. and Monacelli T. (2008) “Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a
Currency Union” Journal of International Economics 76 (1): 116-132
[39] Gelman, A., Carlin, J. B., Stern, H. S. and Rubin,D. B. (1995). Bayesian Data
Analysis. London: Chapman and Hall.
[40] Gerba, E. (2012). “The US Business Cycle: The Balance Sheet Dimension.”
Unpublished Mimeo.
[41] Geweke, J., (1992). “Evaluating the Accuracy of Sampling-Based Approaches
to the Calculation of Posterior Moments.” In Bayesian Statistics, ed J. M.
Bernardo, J. Berger, A. P. Dawid and A. F. M. Smith, 169–193. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
[42] Giavazzi, F., Jappelli, T. and Pagano, M. (2000). “Searching for Non-linear
Effects of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Industrial and Developing Countries.”
European Economic Review, 44(7):1259–1289.
[43] Hauzenberger, K. (2012). “Fiscal Stimulus and Austerity: Estimates Based
on a Time-Varying Parameter VAR with Mixture Innovations.” Unpublished
Mimeo.
[44] Juselius, K. (2007), “The Cointegrated VAR Model: Methodology and Appli-
cations”, Advanced Texts in Econometrics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
36
[45] Kilian, L. and Murphy, D. P. (2012). “Why Agnostic Sign Restrictions are not
enough: Understanding the Dynamics of Oil Market VAR Models.” Journal of
the European Economic Association, 10(5): 1166–1188.
[46] Kim, D. and Yamamoto, Y. (2012). “Time Instability of the US mone-
tary System: Multiple Break Tests and the Reduced Rank TVP VAR.”
http://people.virginia. edu/∼dk4p/tvp-var.pdf.
[47] Kim, S., Shephard, N. and Chib, S. (1998). “Stochastic Volatility: Likelihood
Inference and Comparison with ARCH Models.” Review of Economic Studies,
65(3): 361–393.
[48] Kirchner, M., Cimadomo, J., and Hauptmeier, S. (2010), “Transmission of
Government Spending Shocks in the Euro Area: Time Variation and Driving
Forces”, Unpublished mimeo
[49] Koop, G. and Korobilis, D. (2009). “Bayesian Multivariate Time Series Meth-
ods for Empirical Macroeconomics.” Foundations and Trends in Econometrics,
3: 267–358.
[50] Leeper, E. M. (1991). “Equilibria under ‘Active’ and ‘Passive’ Monetary and
Fiscal Policies.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 27(1): 129–147.
[51] Libich, J., Nguyen, D. T. and Stehlik, P. (2011). “Monetary Exit Strategy and
Fiscal Spillovers.” CAMA Working Paper No. 04/2011.
[52] Melitz, J. (2002). “Some Cross-Country Evidence about Fiscal Policy Behaviour
and Consequences for EMU.” In The Behaviour of Fiscal Authorities, ed M.
Buti, J. von Hagen and C. Martinez-Mongay, 215–240. New York: Palgrave.
[53] Mertens, K., and Ravn, M. (2010), “Fiscal Policy in an Expectations Driven
Liquidity Trap”, Unpublished mimeo
[54] Mountford, A. and Uhlig, H. (2009). “What are the Effects of Fiscal Policy
Shocks?” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 24(6): 960–992.
[55] Muscatelli, V. A., Tirelli, P. and Trecroci, C. (2004). “Fiscal and Monetary
Policy Interactions: Empirical Evidence and Optimal Policy using a Structural
New-Keynesian Model.” Journal of Macroeconomics, 26(2): 257–280.
37
[56] Nakajima, J. (2011), “Time-Varying Parameter VAR Model With Stochastic
Volatility: An Overview of Methodology and Empirical Applications”, Insti-
tute for Monetary and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 11-E-09, Bank of
Japan.
[57] Nyblom, J. (1989). “Testing for the Constancy of Parameters Over Time.”
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 84(405): 223–230.
[58] Pappa, E. (2009). “The Effects of Fiscal Shocks on the Real Wage and Employ-
ment.” International Economic Review, 50(1): 217–244.
[59] Paustian, M. O. (2006). “ When Do Sign Restrictions Work?”
http://dx.doi.org/10. 2139/ssrn.932267.
[60] Pereira, M. C. (2008). “Empirical Evidence on the Stabilizing Role of Fiscal
and Monetary Policies in the US.” MPRA Working Paper No. 19675.
[61] Pereira, M. C. and Lopes, A. S. (2010). “Time Varying Fiscal Policy in the
U.S.”, CEMAPRE Working Paper No. 1004.
[62] Perotti, R. (2007). “In Search of the Transmission Mechanism of Fiscal Policy.”
NBER Working Paper No. 13143.
[63] Pourahmadi, M. (2000), “Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Generalised Lin-
ear Models For Multivariate Normal Covariance Matrix”, Biometrika, 87(2):
425–35.
[64] Primiceri, G. E. (2005). “Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and
Monetary Policy.” Review of Economic Studies, 72(3): 821–852.
[65] Raftery, A. E. and Lewis, S. (1992). “How Many Iterations in the Gibbs Sam-
pler.” In Bayesian Statistics, ed J. M. Bernardo, J. Berger, A. P. Dawid and
A. F. M. Smith, 297–346. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[66] Ramey, V. (2011). “Can Government Purchases Stimulate the Economy.” Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, 49(3): 673–685.
[67] Reade, J. J. and Stehn, J. (2008). “Modelling the Interactions of Monetary and
Fiscal Policies in the US.” Unpublished Mimeo.
38
[68] Romer, C. D. and Bernstein, J. (2009). “The Job Impact of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Plan.” Unpulished Mimeo.
[69] Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H. (2010). “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax
Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks.” American
Economic Review, 100(3): 763–801.
[70] Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H. (2008). “A Narrative Analysis of Postwar Tax
Changes.” http://emlab.berkeley.edu/∼cromer/nadraft408.pdf.
[71] Rossi, B. and Zubairy, S. (2011). “What Is the Importance of Monetary and
Fiscal Shocks in Explaining U.S. Macroeconomic Fluctuations?” Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, 43(6): 1247–1270.
[72] Rotemberg, J. J., and Woodford M. (1992). “Oligopolistic Pricing and the Ef-
fects of Aggregate Demand on Economic Activity. Journal of Political Economy,
100(6): 1153-1207.
[73] Smets, Frank and Raf Wouters (2007), “Shocks and Frictions in US Business
Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach”,The American Economic Review 97 (3):
586–606.
[74] Smith, M., and Kohn, R. (2002), “Parsimonious Covariance Matrix Estima-
tion For Longitudinal Data”, Journal of the American Statistical Association,
97(460): 1141–53.
[75] Uhlig, H. (2005). “What are the Effects of Monteary Policy on Output? Results
froman Agnostic Identification Procedure” Journal of Monetary Economics,
25(2): 381–419.
[76] Woodford, M. (2010), “Simple Analytics of the Government Expenditure Mul-
tiplier”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. w15714
39
A Appendix: Identification scheme
The following table outlines the sign-restrictions used for identifying the four shocks.
Table A.1: Imposed Signs on the Impulse Responses
Spending Net Taxes Output Inflation Interest
rate
Spending shock + +
Tax shock + −
Business cycle shock + +
Monetary policy shock − − +
Notes: A blank entry indicates no restriction on the specific combination of shock and response.
B Bayesian Estimation
The appendix goes through our Bayesian estimation strategy in detail; it draws
heavily on the expositions in Primiceri (2005) and Canova and Gambetti (2009).
As a notational convention, a generic vector or matrix xτ consists of a sequence
of observable variables or estimates up to time τ , i.e. xτ = {xt}τt=1. We express
the realization as zt conditional on an information set, say, x
τ as zt|τ and, likewise,
abbreviate the conditional mean and variance of an arbitrary parameter θ as θt|τ and
V θt|τ . The function p(·) denotes a generic density and dim(·) specifies the dimension
of a vector.
B.1 Priors
An obvious choice to calibrate the priors, and the one pursued here, are simple
estimates from time invariant least squares (OLS) on (1) over the entire sample
as in Canova and Ciccarelli (2009). The positive side effect from using the entire
sample, as opposed to Primiceri’s (2005) training sample prior, is the minimization
of the uncertainty involved in calibrating the priors properly. To denote the time
invariant estimator we will use “hats”.
We follow Canova and Gambetti (2009) and specify the prior densities p(β0),
p(α0) and p(log σ0) for the initial states of the time varying parameters to be nor-
mally distributed, and p(Q), p(Si) and p(W ) for the hyperparameters to follow an
40
inverse Wishart. Specifically,
p(β0) ∼ N(βˆ, 4Var(βˆ)t),
p(α0) ∼ N(αˆ, 4Var(αˆ)),
p(log σ0) ∼ N(log σˆ, Ik)),
p(Q) ∼ IW ((0.0003 · (dim(βˆ) + 1) · Var(βˆ))−1, dim(βˆ) + 1),
p(Si) ∼ IW ((0.001 · (i+ 1) · Sˆi)−1, i+ 1), i = 1, . . . , k − 1,
p(W ) ∼ IW ((0.001 · (dim(σˆ) + 1) · Ik)−1, dim(σˆ) + 1).
The setup of prior densities is more or less standard in the TVP-VAR literature,
although slight differences can be found for the specification of p(Q) with minor
effects on the results. Primiceri (2005), in a trivariate TVP-VAR with two lags, uses
a factor of 0.0001 and a fixed value of 40 for the degrees of freedom. Because of the
hierarchical structure imposed by the laws of motion (11), (12) and (13) the choice of
prior densities leads to normal priors for the entire sequence {βt, αt, log σt}Tt=1. For
the inverse Wishart distribution to have a proper prior the degrees of freedom must
exceed the dimension of the respective hyperparameter at least by one; a choice of
”just one” puts then as little weight as possible on the prior.33 In general, the above
specification transforms the information from the time invariant OLS estimates into
diffuse and uninformative priors.
B.2 Gibbs Sampler
The Gibbs sampling algorithm involves three blocks of conditional distributions for
all the parameters in the model: the coefficient states βt, the covariance states αt,
and the volatility states σt. The first two blocks can easily be cast into a linear and
Gaussian state space form and therefore the standard algorithm for Gibbs sampling
of Carter and Kohn (1994) can be used. Drawing volatility states is a bit more
tricky as they have a nonlinear and non-Gaussian state space form. Kim, Shephard,
and Chib (1998) provide a linear and approximately Gaussian reformulation of the
problem with the advantage of restoring the assumptions needed for the Carter-
Kohn algorithm to work. Step 1 below describes the algorithm in detail. For the
other steps it suffices to show the setup of the state space.
33As the inverse Wishart distribution is a conjugate prior for the covariance matrix of the
corresponding time varying parameters βt, αt and log σt the scale factor has to be a multiple of
the time invariant variance matrices used to calibrate the prior for the initial states.
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Step 1: Coefficient states and algorithm in detail. — Equations (10) and (12),
rewritten here for convenience,
yt = X
′
tβt + ut and βt = βt−1 + νt, (B.1)
constitute a state space model in which both ut and νt are normally distributed with
a zero mean and variances Ωt and Q. Further, the block diagonal structure of (14)
assumes that ut and νt are mutually uncorrelated. Now, conditional on the data,
αT , σT , sT and V the variance Ωt in the observation equation is known from (7) and
we can therefore generate the whole sequence βT as in Lemma 2.1 of Carter and
Kohn (1994):
p
(
βT |yT , αT , σT , sT , V ) = p (βT |yT , αT , σT , sT , V ) T−1∏
t=1
p
(
βt|βt+1, yt, αt, σt, st, V
)
.
The function of sT will become clear momentarily in Step 3. Then, to get βT from
p
(
βT |yT , · · · ) we, first, generate βT from p(βT |yT , · · · ) = N(βT |T , V βT |T ) and, second,
for t = T − 1, . . . , 1 we draw βt from p
(
βt|βt+1, yt, · · ·
)
= N
(
βt|t+1, V
β
t|t+1
)
. Starting
from β0|0 = βˆ and V
β
0|0 = Var(βˆ) the Kalman filter recursion over t = 1, . . . , T , i.e.
βt|t−1 = βt−1|t−1,
V βt|t−1 = V
β
t−1|t−1 +Q,
βt|t = βt|t−1 + V
β
t|t−1Xt
(
X ′tV
β
t|t−1Xt + Ωt
)−1 (
yt −X ′tβt|t−1
)
and
V βt|t = V
β
t|t−1 − V βt|t−1Xt
(
X ′tV
β
t|t−1Xt + Ωt
)−1
X ′tβt|t−1,
leads to a draw of βT from the normal distribution using the elements βT |T and V
β
T |T
from the last recursion. We now plug the results of the filter and the draw of βT
into a reversed version of the Kalman filter to derive βT−1|T V
β
T−1|T . This backward
updating delivers a draw for βT−1 and so forth until we arrive at β1. Specially, the
backward updating steps for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1 are
βt|t+1 = βt|t + V
β
t|t
(
V βt|t +Q
)−1 (
βt+1 − βt|t
)
and
V βt|t+1 = V
β
t|t − V βt|t
(
V βt|t +Q
)−1
V βt|t.
For more details on Gibbs sampling for state space models and the Kalman filter
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see Carter and Kohn (1994) and Anderson and Moore (1979).
Then, given βT , we can observe the innovation νt in (12) and draw the hyper-
parameter Q from the inverse Wishart distribution with scale parameters (0.0003 ·
(dim(βˆ) + 1) · Var(βˆ) +∑Tt=1 ∆βt∆β′t)−1 and degrees of freedom dim(βˆ) + 1 + T .
Step 2: Covariance states. — While the state equation for αt is readily available
from (11), the derivation of the observation equation requires some work. Omitting
the orthonormal rotation matrix Gt which is not part of the estimation stage, let us
write (10) as
Atut = Σtεt with ut = (yt −X ′tβt) . (B.2)
Conditional on βT we can observe the reduced-form residuals ut and given the tri-
angular form of the αt’s we can rewrite (B.2) as
ut = Ztαt + Σtεt, (B.3)
with
Zt =

0 0 0 0
[−ui,t] 0 0 0
0 [−ux,t,−ug,t] 0 0
0 0 [−ux,t,−ug,t,−ut,t] 0
0 0 0 [−ux,t, . . . ,−upi,t]

.
It becomes now obvious why assuming S to be block diagonal in (14) reduces the
complexity of the Bayesian estimation. Under the block diagonality we can splice
up the state space model in separate equations. Splicing up the model in this
manner restores the exogeneity requirement of the Kalman filter and we can apply
the algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994), as laid out in Step 1, equation by equation.
To formalize these separate equations let [ij] = i, . . . , j and [rs] = r, . . . , s denote
two indices running from i to j and r to s. Now write (B.3) as
u[ij],t = µ[ij],t + Z[ij,ij],tα[rs],t + Σ[ij,ij],tε[ij],t (B.4)
in which the indices in brackets, i = 2, j = 2, . . . , 4, r = 1, 2, 4 and s = r + j − 2,
select the required subvectors and matrices for the k − 1 = 4 equations.
Step 3: Volatility states p
(
σT |yT , βT , αT , sT , V ). — Drawing σT relies on the al-
gorithm of Kim, Shephard, and Chib (1998), a procedure to transform an otherwise
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nonlinear and non-Gaussian state space model into a linear and approximately nor-
mal one. The standard algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994), as laid out in Step1,
is therefore again available. The observation equation can be written as
At (yt −X ′tβt) = et with et = Σtεt. (B.5)
Given yT , and βT and αT from the two previous Gibbs sampling block et is observ-
able. Since we have defined the law of motion (13) for the diagonal entries of Σt as a
geometric random walk, we can convert (B.5) into the appropriate form by squaring
and taking the logarithm. We then obtain the “linearized” state space model
e∗t = 2 log σt + ξt and log σt = log σt−1 + ηt, (B.6)
in which e∗i,t = log
(
e2i,t + 0.001
)
and ξi,t = log
(
2i,t
)
for i = (g, t, x, pi, i); the offset
constant 0.001 deals with very small values of e2i,t as in Kim, Shephard and Chib
(1998); and the innovation ξt follows a logχ
2(1) distribution. While this conversion
restores the linearity assumption the distributional form of ξt still precludes direct
and simple inference. Kim, Shephard and Chib (1998) show how to accurately
approximate the logχ2(1) distribution through a matched mixture of seven Normal
distributions,
f (ξi,t) ≈
7∑
j=1
pjN
(
ξi,t|mj − 1.2704, v2j
)
, i = (g, t, x, pi, i), (B.7)
in which N
(
ξi,t|mj−1.2704, v2j
)
denotes the density function of a normal distribution
with mean mj − 1.2704 and variance v2j . Values for pj, mj and v2j are reproduced
in Table B.1. Conditional on sT we can draw a value for ξi,t|si,t = j ∼ N
(
mj −
1.2704, v2j
)
and proceed as in Step 1 to draw log σi,t for all i and t. Given these
draws of ξi,t we independently sample the indicator matrix si,t selecting the mixture
j = 1, . . . , 7 from the discrete density Pr (si,t = j|e∗t , log σi,t), a density which is
proportionally determined from the normal density N
(
e∗t |2 log σi,t+mj−1.2704, v2j
)
.
B.3 Convergence Diagnostics of the Markov Chain
From theoretical work such as Gelfand and Smith 1990 we know that the Gibbs
sampler converges to the “true” joint posterior distribution as the number of itera-
tions go to infinity. Whether this property holds in the underlying problem with a
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Table B.1: Selection of the Mixing Distribution to be logχ2(1).
j pj mj v
2
j j pj mj v
2
j
1 0.00730 −10.12999 5.79596 5 0.34001 0.61942 0.64009
2 0.10556 −3.97281 2.61369 6 0.24566 1.79518 0.34023
3 0.00002 −8.56685 5.17950 7 0.25750 −1.08819 1.26261
4 0.04395 2.77786 0.16735
Notes: Replication of Table 4 in Kim, Shephard, and Chib (1998).
finite number is an important question which we address here.
We implement three MCMC convergence diagnostics for the 20, 000 saved draws
of each parameter and hyperparameter: the sample autocorrelation; the measure of
Geweke (1992); and the diagnostic of Raftery and Lewis (1992). Table B.2 reports
the results of the diagnostic checks. Because of the sheer amount of parameters the
table shows summary statistics, grouped into hyperparameters V , coefficients βT ,
covariances αT and volatilities σT . Moreover, each summary statistic reports two
values based on the first and last 1, 500 draws from the 20, 000 saved iterations. This
testing strategy adds another layer to the formal MCMC diagnostics: if the Markov
chain is in an equilibrium state the medians and percentiles of the two splits should
be of roughly equal size.
The 20-th order sample autocorrelations summarized in Panel A of Table B.2
show a relatively low degree of autocorrelation. Only a few hyperparameters V
exhibit statistics higher than 0.2. The draws are therefore almost independent, an
indication for the efficiency of the Gibbs sampler and for accurate posterior esti-
mates. Related to that is the inefficiency factor, as measured by the inverse of the
relative numerical efficiency statistic of Geweke (1992) with a 4 percent tapered win-
dow for the estimation of the spectral density at frequency zero. If the draws come
from an independent and identically distribute (iid) sample, drawn directly form
the posterior distribution, the inefficiency factor has a value of one. For instance,
in Panel B of Table B.2 the median value of 15.81 for the first 1,500 draws of the
hyperparameters V indicates that one would need about 16 times as many draws
to achieve the same numerical efficiency as the iid benchmark. Since only values
above 20 are considered to be critical and 24.81 is the largest 95-th percentile here
the efficiency diagnostic can be regarded as satisfactory. Finally, Raftery and Lewis
(1992) provide a measure of the number of draws actually required to achieve a cer-
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Table B.2: Convergence Diagnostics of the Markov Chain
First block of 1,500 draws Last block of 1,500 draws
Median 5-th 95-th Median 5-th 95-th
A. 20-th Order Sample Autocorrelations
V 0.19 0.04 0.36 0.19 0.02 0.39
βT 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.07 −0.00 0.15
αT 0.02 −0.03 0.12 0.03 −0.00 0.09
σT 0.01 −0.04 0.08 0.01 −0.04 0.08
B. Inefficiency Factor
V 15.81 9.08 23.47 16.02 8.88 24.81
βT 5.45 2.75 9.79 5.46 2.89 10.59
αT 3.53 0.87 8.00 4.30 0.69 6.85
σT 3.08 1.96 6.38 3.19 1.84 6.26
Notes: Summary of the distributions of the 20-th order sample autocorrelations and the ineffi-
ciency factors (the inverse of Geweke’s (1992) measure of relative numerical efficiency with a 4
percent tapering of the spectral window at frequency zero). “10-th” and “90-th” denote the 5-th
and 95-th percentiles. Statistics bases on the first and last 1,500 draws of the 20,000 saved draws.
We run 50,000 burn-in draws and set the thinning factor equal to three.
tain accuracy. I specify the parameters for the diagnostic as in Primiceri (2005): a
“quantile” of 0.025, a desired “accuracy” of 0.025, and the “probability” of attaining
the accuracy equals 95 percent. The maximum number over the whole parameter
space for the Raftery and Lewis (1992) diagnostic is 3,082 and thus well below the
20,000 draws used in the analysis. All three diagnostics and the comparison of the
sample splits seem satisfactory.
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Table 1: Forecast Error Variance Decompositions: Sign Restrictions
Identified Shocks
Variables Horizon Spending Tax Bus. Cycle Monetary
A. Volcker Chairmanship (1979-1984)
Spending 1 55.8 17.7 0.7 16.2
4 52.9 17.2 0.8 15.2
8 50.2 16.9 0.9 14.4
20 43.5 17.9 1.3 13.3
Net Taxes 1 6.3 58.3 1.5 20.6
4 5.7 24.9 3.9 16.9
8 11.4 22.1 3.2 17.6
20 17.9 21.7 2.2 16.7
Output 1 30.3 36.8 11.7 1.5
4 28.5 38.1 12.4 1.5
8 29.8 42.2 10.3 1.5
20 33.2 47.1 7.0 1.3
Inflation 1 17.2 19.0 22.2 10.1
4 18.8 17.9 22.2 10.9
8 18.3 17.5 22.3 10.9
20 18.8 17.4 22.4 10.9
Interest Rate 1 12.2 11.8 28.0 10.6
4 12.2 10.5 32.3 6.7
8 14.9 12.5 29.2 7.8
20 17.9 13.5 26.2 8.5
B. Great Moderation (1985-2006)
Spending 1 51.4 17.9 0.6 21.4
4 48.0 17.6 0.7 19.0
8 44.9 17.1 0.8 17.2
20 37.3 17.0 1.3 14.7
Net Taxes 1 6.4 57.6 1.3 23.3
4 4.9 18.5 4.0 11.9
8 8.7 16.4 3.7 12.1
20 16.6 17.1 2.3 14.2
Output 1 29.4 34.3 12.8 0.6
4 27.6 36.2 13.1 0.6
8 28.4 38.8 11.9 0.7
20 33.1 43.5 8.2 1.0
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (sign restrictions continued)
Identified Shocks
Variables Horizon Spending Tax Bus. Cycle Monetary
Inflation 1 13.5 15.5 23.4 6.1
4 17.0 14.0 23.1 9.5
8 16.8 14.0 23.3 9.7
20 17.0 13.9 23.7 9.8
Interest Rate 1 8.4 8.6 29.8 7.3
4 9.1 7.9 33.0 4.3
8 10.8 10.1 31.4 5.3
20 14.7 11.4 27.9 7.2
C. Great Recession (2007-2012)
Spending 1 43.7 25.6 0.6 21.8
4 39.7 26.4 0.7 18.7
8 36.7 26.3 0.9 17.2
20 29.9 25.9 1.4 15.1
Net Taxes 1 4.6 57.5 0.8 26.1
4 3.1 15.4 2.9 12.6
8 5.2 14.6 2.8 13.1
20 10.1 16.8 1.9 15.7
Output 1 24.4 38.2 13.5 0.9
4 23.0 42.3 12.6 0.8
8 24.0 45.4 11.2 0.9
20 28.5 49.9 7.8 1.3
Inflation 1 14.7 15.7 23.4 8.8
4 17.7 13.3 23.0 12.3
8 17.3 13.1 23.4 12.0
20 17.1 13.0 24.0 11.8
Interest Rate 1 8.5 8.7 29.5 6.5
4 11.5 10.0 29.6 5.8
8 12.7 12.1 28.3 7.5
20 14.8 12.7 26.4 9.1
Notes: Posterior means of the percent of forecast error variance attributed to our four
shocks.
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Table 2: Forecast Error Variance Decompositions: Recursive Identification
Identified Shocks
Variables Horizon Spending Tax Bus.Cycle Monetary
A. Volcker Chairmanship (1979-1984)
Spending 1 55.8 17.7 0.7 16.2
4 52.9 17.2 0.8 15.2
8 50.2 16.9 0.9 14.4
20 43.5 17.9 1.3 13.3
Net Taxes 1 6.3 58.3 1.5 20.6
4 5.7 24.9 3.9 16.9
8 11.4 22.1 3.2 17.6
20 17.9 21.7 2.2 16.7
Output 1 30.3 36.8 11.7 1.5
4 28.5 38.1 12.4 1.5
8 29.8 42.2 10.3 1.5
20 33.2 47.1 7.0 1.3
Inflation 1 17.2 19.0 22.2 10.1
4 18.8 17.9 22.2 10.9
8 18.3 17.5 22.3 10.9
20 18.8 17.4 22.4 10.9
Interest Rate 1 12.2 11.8 28.0 10.6
4 12.2 10.5 32.3 6.7
8 14.9 12.5 29.2 7.8
20 17.9 13.5 26.2 8.5
B. Great Moderation (1985-2006)
Spending 1 51.4 17.9 0.6 21.4
4 48.0 17.6 0.7 19.0
8 44.9 17.1 0.8 17.2
20 37.3 17.0 1.3 14.7
Net Taxes 1 6.4 57.6 1.3 23.3
4 4.9 18.5 4.0 11.9
8 8.7 16.4 3.7 12.1
20 16.6 17.1 2.3 14.2
Output 1 29.4 34.3 12.8 0.6
4 27.6 36.2 13.1 0.6
8 28.4 38.8 11.9 0.7
20 33.1 43.5 8.2 1.0
(continued on next page)
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Table 2 (recursive identification continued)
Identified Shocks
Variables Horizon Spending Tax Bus. Cycle Monetary
Inflation 1 13.5 15.5 23.4 6.1
4 17.0 14.0 23.1 9.5
8 16.8 14.0 23.3 9.7
20 17.0 13.9 23.7 9.8
Interest Rate 1 8.4 8.6 29.8 7.3
4 9.1 7.9 33.0 4.3
8 10.8 10.1 31.4 5.3
20 14.7 11.4 27.9 7.2
C. Great Recession (2007-2012)
Spending 1 43.7 25.6 0.6 21.8
4 39.7 26.4 0.7 18.7
8 36.7 26.3 0.9 17.2
20 29.9 25.9 1.4 15.1
Net Taxes 1 4.6 57.5 0.8 26.1
4 3.1 15.4 2.9 12.6
8 5.2 14.6 2.8 13.1
20 10.1 16.8 1.9 15.7
Output 1 24.4 38.2 13.5 0.9
4 23.0 42.3 12.6 0.8
8 24.0 45.4 11.2 0.9
20 28.5 49.9 7.8 1.3
Inflation 1 14.7 15.7 23.4 8.8
4 17.7 13.3 23.0 12.3
8 17.3 13.1 23.4 12.0
20 17.1 13.0 24.0 11.8
Interest Rate 1 8.5 8.7 29.5 6.5
4 11.5 10.0 29.6 5.8
8 12.7 12.1 28.3 7.5
20 14.8 12.7 26.4 9.1
Notes: Posterior means of the percent of forecast error variance attributed to our four
shocks.
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Figure 1: Standard Deviation of Residuals
Notes: Posterior median, 16-th and 84-th percentiles of the standard deviation of the TVP-VAR
residuals in the spending, tax, output, inflation and interest rate equations. Units on the y-axis
denote 10,000 real per capita dollars and percentage points (PP).
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Figure 2: Response to a Business Cycle Shock
(continued on next page)
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Figure 2 (business cycle shock continued)
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Notes: Median impulse responses of the three episodes, Volcker chairmanship (blue lines with
circles), Great Moderation (black lines with squares) and the Great Recession (red lines with
diamonds), and comparison of identification methods; results from constant VAR superimposed
(black dashed lines). Units are in brackets. The normalized output response represents a one dollar
shock to spending and taxes, and a one percent shock to inflation and the short-term interest rate;
deviations of the nominal variables from trend are expressed in quarterly percentage points (PP).
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Figure 3: Response to a Spending Shock
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Figure 3 (spending shock continued)
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Notes: Median impulse responses of the three episodes, Volcker chairmanship (blue lines with
circles), Great Moderation (black lines with squares) and the Great Recession (red lines with
diamonds), and comparison of identification methods; results from constant VAR superimposed
(black dashed lines). Units are in brackets. The normalized spending response represents a one
dollar shock to output and taxes, and a one percent shock to inflation and the short-term interest
rate; deviations of the nominal variables from trend are expressed in quarterly percentage points
(PP).
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Figure 4: Response to a Tax Shock
(continued on next page)
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Figure 4 (tax shock continued)
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Notes: Median impulse responses of the three episodes, Volcker chairmanship (blue lines with
circles), Great Moderation (black lines with squares) and the Great Recession (red lines with
diamonds), and comparison of identification methods; results from constant VAR superimposed
(black dashed lines). Units are in brackets. The normalized tax response represents a negative
one dollar shock to spending and output, and a negative one percent shock to inflation and the
short-term interest rate; deviations of the nominal variables from trend are expressed in quarterly
percentage points (PP).
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Figure 5: Response to a Monetary Policy Shock
(continued on next page)
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Figure 5 (monetary policy shock continued)
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Notes: Median impulse responses of the three episodes, Volcker chairmanship (blue line with cir-
cles), Great Moderation (black line with squares) and the Great Recession (red line with diamonds),
and comparison of identification methods; results from constant VAR superimposed (black dashed
lines). Units are in brackets. The normalized response of the short-term interest rate represents a
one percentage point (PP) shock.
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